摘要
针对由一个制造商与一个零售商构成的供应链,考虑消费者的策略性跨期购买行为,构建了两周期动态博弈模型,分析了消费者策略性程度对两周期均衡结果、消费者剩余和社会福利的影响,比较了分散式与集中式决策的均衡偏差,设计了与消费者策略性程度相关的两周期收益共享契约与"两周期收益共享+转移支付"组合式契约。研究表明:分散式决策下,消费者策略性程度有利于增加消费者剩余和社会福利,但会对供应链成员不利;某些情形下,消费者策略性程度会使分散式与集中式决策的系统利润差值增大;当消费者策略性程度相对较低时,两周期收益共享契约不仅可实现供应链完美协调,还可增加消费者剩余和社会福利;当消费者策略性程度较高时,通过组合式契约可实现供应链完美协调,但此时消费者策略性程度的增强可能对消费者剩余和社会福利产生负面影响。
With the rapid development of information technology and internet,it is more and more convenient for consumers to obtain product information.As a result,consumers are becoming more and more rational.Consumers can strategically choose the time for purchase to maximize their utility.Because of the perishability of products and the fierce market competition,the firms often use markdown promotion to increase sales.Although the sales revenue can be quickly realized by markdown promotion,it will induce more consumers to choose to purchase at the markdown sales stage.This may lead to a reduction in demand at the normal sales stage,which is not benefit for the firms to obtain the high profit.In addition,the reduction in demand during the normal sales stage will lead to a reduction in the order quantity,which will adversely affect the upstream manufacturers.Therefore,according to the strategic purchase behavior of consumers,how to set the price in the normal sales and promotion stage and how to design effective contracts to coordinate the supply chain are researched in this paper.Considering a supply chain consists of a manufacturer and a retailer in which consumers’strategic purchase behavior exists,a two-period dynamic game model is established to analyze the effects of strategic degree of consumers’purchase behavior on the two-period equilibrium results,consumer surplus and social welfare.The optimal two-period dynamic pricing of the manufacturer and the retailer is studied.Further,the equilibrium results under the decentralized decision are compared with those under the centralized decision.Moreover,a two-period revenue sharing contract and a two-period revenue sharing contract combined with a transfer payment are proposed,which are related to the consumers’strategic degree.The results show that:(1)When the consumers’strategic degree is high,both the manufacturer and the retailer should decrease the price of the first period and increase the price of the second period,the total profit of the manufacturer and the retailer for two periods will decrease,the consumer surplus and social welfare will increase.(2)Under some cases,the consumers’strategic degree will weaken the price distortion in the two periods of decentralized decision,but the differences between the decentralized and the centralized system profits will increase with the consumers’strategic degree.(3)When the consumers’strategic degree is below a certain threshold,the two-period revenue-sharing contract can not only achieve supply chain perfect coordination but also improve consumer surplus and social welfare.(4)When the consumers’strategic degree is not below a certain threshold,the two-period revenue sharing combined with a transfer payment contract can achieve supply chain perfect coordination.However,the increase of consumers’strategic degree is not always able to improve consumer surplus or social welfare in this case.
作者
张旭梅
王大飞
任廷海
官子力
但斌
ZHANG Xu-mei;WANG Da-fei;REN Ting-hai;GUAN Zi-li;DAN Bin(School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China;Chongqing Key Laboratory of Logistics,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2020年第7期132-145,共14页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71572020)
中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(2017CDJSK02PT08)
重庆市自然科学基金博士后科学基金(cstc2019jcyj-bshX0080)。
关键词
消费者策略行为
动态定价
供应链协调
两周期收益共享契约
consumers’strategic behavior
dynamic pricing
supply chain coordination
two-period revenue sharing contract
