摘要
在当代哲学脉络中,“激情”构成了一个主要的难题。但是“激情”在理性主义的唯理论传统里,在笛卡儿哲学的传统里,只可能占据一个非理性的位置,而难以获得构成性的哲学身份。斯宾诺莎哲学为这个难题提供了一种解决方案。斯宾诺莎认为,“激情”只是affecus/affect的消极部分,而后者才是更为普遍的概念。斯宾诺莎通过对affecus/affect概念的理性主义建构,使之褪去了“情感”的意义,成为事物在身体和心灵两套顺序中共同的动作原则,因而具有了理性的决定,也表现着决定的理性。在这个意义上,affecus/affect不仅不能再单纯地被理解为“情感”,而且不能简单地译解为“情动”。相反,该概念应在存在论、物理学和精神的现象学三重层面上被译解为“受感致动的情状”。
“Passion”constitutes the one of problems in contemporary current of philosophy.In view of modern rationalists such as Descartes,passion s status is properly irrational,so that it could not be given the real recognition by rational philosophy.On the contrary,Spinoza proposes that passion is passive effect of the affect,and affect is the elementary manner of action in which the body order and soul order commonly act.As result,affectus/affect is more general acting than passion,and has rational determination,expressing the determining reason.In that sense,affectus/affect cannot be understood as emotion or sentiment,but should be apprehended as the acting manner of body and soul in the triple-demsension of ontology,physics and phenomenology of Spirit。
出处
《文化研究》
2019年第3期234-247,共14页
Cultural Studies
