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财税法视角下国有企业腐败治理机制研究 被引量:1

Research on the Governance Mechanism of State-owned Enterprise Corruption from the Perspective of Finance and Tax Law
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摘要 党的十八大以来,反腐败工作被提升到了前所未有的高度,国有企业的反腐败工作作为国家反腐败斗争的重要组成部分,受到了各界的高度重视。加强国有企业的腐败治理,推动国企反腐败斗争向纵深发展势在必行。从财税法的角度来看,国企的腐败行为直接导致了我国财政收入的减少以及国有资产的流失,同时对我国的国有资产管理制度、税收制度等造成了严重的负面影响。这就要求对于国有企业的腐败治理,不仅要对腐败人员加以惩戒,同时还应当构建相应的预防机制,防止国家财产的流失。本文分别从内部和外部研究了应然层面的国有企业反腐内外部控制的原理及制度设计,并探讨了当下国有企业腐败控制的机制缺陷,提出应当构建以“治财”作为核心,以预防为导向,加强国有企业的内外部财务控制,以此截断腐败寻租的源头。 Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,the anti-corruption work has been promoted to an unprecedented level.As an important part of the national anti-corruption struggle,the anti-corruption work of state-owned enterprises has been highly valued by all walks of life.It is imperative to strengthen the corruption governance of state-owned enterprises and promote the anti-corruption struggle of state-owned enterprises.From the point of view of finance and tax law,the corruption of state-owned enterprises directly leads to the decrease of financial revenue and the loss of state-owned assets,and has a serious negative impact on the management system and tax system of state-owned assets.This requires not only to punish the corrupt personnel,but also to build the corresponding prevention mechanism to prevent the loss of state property.This paper studies the principles and system design of the internal control of corruption in stateowned enterprises from the internal and external aspects,and discusses the defects of the current mechanism of corruption control in state-owned enterprises.It is proposed that we should build a“governance of finance”as the core,take prevention as the guide,strengthen the internal and external financial control of state-owned enterprises,so as to cut off the source of corruption and rent-seeking.
作者 任豪 REN Hao(Graduate School,Party School of the Central Committee of C.P.C,Beijing 100089,China)
出处 《治理现代化研究》 2020年第5期35-46,共12页 Governance Modernization Studies
关键词 反腐败 财税法 国有企业 anti-corruption finance and tax law state-owned enterprise
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