摘要
线上农产品供应链金融作为涉农中小企业融资新模式近年来取得迅猛发展,银行与电商合作作为业务主流模式得到广泛认可。以农产品电子订单质押为例,聚焦道德风险问题,运用委托代理理论研究银行与B2B平台间的激励契约设计问题,构建考虑B2B平台过度自信因素的委托代理模型,推导并给出模型结果。结果显示,过度自信会影响银行收益、报酬契约设计、B2B平台努力水平及代理成本,且B2B平台的努力水平、银行收益及激励系数随着过度自信水平的提高而增加,银行固定支付及代理成本则随过度自信水平的提高而减少。
Online agricultural supply chain finance,as a new financing model for agricultural SMEs(Small and Medium-sized Enterprises),has achieved rapid development in recent years,and cooperation between banks and e-commerce functions has been widely recognized as a mainstream business model.Taking the electronic order pledge for agricultural products as an example,we focus on the issue of moral hazard and apply principal-agent theory to study the design of incentive contracts between banks and B2B platforms.This paper introduces research problems with practical cases.In practice,banks and B2B platforms cooperate closely,but B2B platforms show a tendency to conceal information,which poses a challenge to the security of bank funds.While we expect that the design of appropriate incentive contracts may help to avoid or mitigate this problem,further investigation found that the evaluated B2B platforms overestimated their own capabilities during the execution of the commissioning business.This phenomenon cannot be fully explained by only relying on the traditional principal-agent model.To better explain the conclusions of this research,an overconfidence factor was introduced into the model to test the effect of this factor on the outcome of the contract.We followed existing research that analyzes B2B platforms to characterize the overconfidence factor,and believe that it can effectively reduce external uncertainties if the information has high accuracy.Under conditions of information asymmetry,the model construction needs to meet the incentive compatibility constraints and participation constraints.On this basis,the banks select appropriate incentive coefficients and fixed payments to achieve the maximum benefits.After the model is established,the optimal effort level of the B2B platform and the bank's optimal incentive coefficient,fixed payments,and profit can be derived.The results obtained from this model were analyzed one by one,and the following conclusions drawn:(1)Overconfidence helps banks set up a contract with high incentives and low fixed payments;(2)Overconfidence helps improve the B2B platform’s level of effort;(3)Overconfidence helps increase banks’earnings;(4)Overconfidence helps reduce agency costs;(5)The joint credit incentive coefficient of the bank and B2B platform is higher than that of the same bank with a third-party logistics enterprise.In accordance with the conclusions of this research,the following suggestions are offered to banks with respect to the design of contracts:(1)The effort level of B2B platforms should be improved through incentive coefficients;(2)For B2B platforms with overconfidence behaviors,contracts should be designed with high incentives and low fixed payments;(3)When selecting a B2B platform under the same conditions,an overconfident B2B platform should be preferred as the partner;(4)The degree of application of big data technology,information and processing technology,etc.by the B2B platform should be promoted.Finally,the research detailed within this paper is summarized,along with its limitations,and possible directions for future research are presented.
作者
徐鹏
XU Peng(China Research Institute of Enterprise Governed by Law,Southwest University of Political Science and Law,Chongqing 401120,China)
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2020年第4期60-67,共8页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71872154)。
关键词
过度自信
线上
农产品供应链金融
B2B平台
激励契约
Overconfidence
Online
Agricultural product supply chain
B2B platform
Incentive contract
