摘要
本文以2010—2017年中国沪深A股18107个公司年度观测样本为研究对象,基于巡视监督的准自然实验考察国家治理体系影响国有企业创新行为的作用机理。研究发现:巡视监督促使国有企业创新投资决策更为稳健,在促进创新投入的同时也提高了创新产出,进而提升创新效率。平均而言,巡视监督每上升一个标准差将提高国有企业45.368%的创新效率;巡视监督通过减少管理层短视行为和寻租行为来实现国有企业创新效率治理效应;巡视监督可以显著提高创新对国有企业业绩和价值增长的边际贡献。本文从创新效率的角度评估了推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化建设的非预期效果,为加强国有企业巡视监督工作提供了可靠的经验证据。
Innovation plays an extremely important and positive role in promoting economic growth.Report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China has clearly pointed out that innovation as the primary motivity to lead the development,is considered the strategic support for the construction of modern economic system.As the main part of the technological innovation system,the technological innovation of enterprises is a systematic project.How to promote the technological innovation of enterprises has always been paid great attention in the academic community and practical community.The academic community has already reached fruitful results of factors that influencing enterprise innovation,from both macroeconomic and microeconomic perspective.From the macroeconomic perspective,scholars have paid much more attention to the effect that the government actions has on the innovation of enterprises,such as economic policy,industrial policy monetary policy and tax policy,while there are few literatures which examine the important function of the party in the innovation of enterprises.The main reason for such deficiencies in theoretical literature is that scholars cannot find a convincing alternative variable of non-economic system,which leads to the inability to establish a rigorous logical framework and empirical model to analyze the transmission path of state governance system affecting enterprise innovation.As a strategic system arrangement of intra-party supervision,inspection supervision has a special and important position in the supervision system of the Communist Party of China.As a quasi-natural experiment carried out nationwide,inspection supervision provides a rare research opportunity for the academic community to study the influence of the state governance system on the behavior of micro enterprises.Existing literature has proved that inspection supervision can have an impact on corporate performance,internal control concerns and negative information release,which is of positive significance for the academic and practical community to study the microeconomic consequences of inspection supervision.However,no literature has been able to study the impact of inspection supervision on the decision-making behavior of state-owned enterprises from the perspective of innovation efficiency.This provides a rare opportunity for the research of this paper.Therefore,it is of great practical significance and theoretical value to study the influence mechanism of non-economic system factors in the state governance system on the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises with inspection supervision as the entry point.Based in the above,this paper takes the annual observation samples of 18107 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market from 2010 to 2017 as the object,and studies the influence mechanism of the Party on the innovation efficiency of enterprises based on the quasi natural experiment of inspection supervision,and analyses the impact that inspection supervision of the Communist Party of China has on the improvement of performance and value growth of innovation.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:first,inspection supervision of the Communist Party of China could actively promote the innovation activities of state-owned enterprises,which would improve the innovation input,output and efficiency,and this conclusion is still robust after controlling endogenous problems.Second,inspection supervision will improve the innovation efficiency by reducing the occurrence of short-sighted behavior of management and the occurrence of rent-seeking behavior.Third,inspection supervision of the Communist Party of China can significantly improve the marginal contribution of innovation to the performance and value of state-owned enterprise.
作者
陈克兢
万清清
康艳玲
Chen Kejing;Wan Qingqing;Kang Yanling(School of Accounting/China Internal Control Research Center,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,Liaoning,China)
出处
《科研管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2020年第8期211-219,共9页
Science Research Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目:“中国上市公司精准扶贫行为研究:动机与经济后果”(71802043,2019—2021)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目:“外部大股东退出威胁的公司治理效应研究:流动性外生出冲击的调节作用”(18YJC630007,2018—2020)
辽宁省社会科学规划基金青年项目:“国有企业债务违约的预警、传染与防范研究———以辽宁省为例”(L16CGL005,2016—2019)。
关键词
国家治理体系
巡视监督
创新效率
治理效应
公司价值
state governance system
inspection supervision
innovation efficiency
governance effect
corporate value
