摘要
2015年以来控股股东杠杆增持现象对资本市场和企业经营产生了重要影响。本文考察了控股股东采用杠杆方式增持股份对企业现金持有水平的影响。研究发现:①控股股东杠杆增持与企业现金持有水平显著负相关;②控股股东杠杆增持主要通过缓解融资约束和代理成本,降低企业持现的预防性动机和代理动机,实现现金持有水平的下降,说明杠杆增持促使控股股东在公司治理中更多地表现为"利益协同效应";③控股股东杠杆增持在降低现金持有水平的同时提升了企业价值、降低了公司股价崩盘风险,但控股股东自身高杠杆会抑制杠杆增持对企业现金持有水平的"利益协同效应",说明杠杆增持也并非越高越好。本文丰富了控股股东杠杆增持的经济后果及影响机制的研究,拓展了企业现金持有动机理论的应用范围,也为决策部门出台鼓励控股股东杠杆增持政策提供了经验证据,以及监管部门防范金融风险提供了重要的政策启示。
The phenomenon of controlling shareholders’ leverage increase has had an important impact on capital market and enterprise operation since 2015. This paper investigates the influence of controlling shareholders’ leverage on cash holding level. It is found that: ① Controlling shareholders’ leverage increase is negatively correlated with the corporate cash holding. ② Controlling shareholders’ leverage increase mainly reduces the preventive motivation of cash holding by alleviating financing constraints, and alleviates the agency motivation of cash holding by reducing agency cost, thus realizing the decline of cash holding level. That is, leveraged increase promotes controlling shareholders manifesting more synergistic effect. ③ Controlling shareholders’ leveraged holding increases the value of enterprises and reduces the risk of stock price collapse while lowering the cash holding level. However, the controlling shareholder’s self height leverage will restrain the alignment synergy effect, which proves that leverage increase is moderate. This paper extends the application scope of corporate cash holding motivation theory, and enriches the research on the economic consequences and influence mechanism of controlling shareholders’ leverage increase behavior. Meanwhile, it also provides practical test for the authorities to encourage controlling shareholders’ leverage increase, and provides important policy enlightenment for regulatory departments to prevent financial risks.
作者
熊凌云
蒋尧明
连立帅
杨李娟
XIONG Ling-yun;JIANG Yao-ming;LIAN Li-shuai;YANG Li-juan(School of Accounting JUFE,Nanchang 330013,China;Accounting Development Research Center JUFE,Nanchang 330013,China;Facualty of Economics and Management,East China Normal University,Shanghai200241,China)
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第8期137-155,共19页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金地区项目“会计事务所合伙人与非合伙人签字注册会计师民事责任的配置及其对执业质量的影响研究”(批准号71962011)
江西省社会科学规划青年项目“控股股东杠杆增持对企业现金持有水平的影响研究”(批准号19GL42)
江西省高校人文社会科学研究青年项目“控股股东杠杆增持对股价崩盘风险的影响机制研究”(批准号GL19207)。
关键词
控股股东杠杆增持
企业现金持有
利益协同效应
融资约束
代理成本
controlling shareholders’leverage increase
corporate cash holding
alignment effect
financing constraints
agency cost
