摘要
学校与企业的不同利益诉求是阻碍高职教育校企深度合作的核心因素,政府的介入促使利益格局重新调整。为理清三者在校企合作过程中的复杂利益关系,揭示政府的激励政策对利益分配格局的影响机理,本文以演化博弈论为分析工具,构建了政府、学校和企业在不完全信息条件下的非对称博弈模型,并对三者在博弈过程中的利益、心理和决策行为做了演化分析。从演化分析结果可知,博弈结果非常依赖敏感的初始条件,初始条件与阈值的关系影响着政府的施政空间和抵御风险的能力。因此,政府应主动出击,制定灵活多样的经济激励政策,激发企业参与高职教育办学的积极性;提高产教融合水平,让企业获得更多额外收益;对学校实行"大棒+胡萝卜"政策,提升高职院校深化校企合作的主动性;强化政府在校企合作中的责任主体意识,营造良好的合作氛围,促使学校和企业的合作由有限理性向完全理性转变,以实现最终博弈的帕累托最优均衡。
Schools and enterprises play different roles in this society,which contribute to their different interest demands.These internal core factors hinder the in-depth school-enterprise cooperation.But the government’s intervention has changed the interest pattern,and the interest distribution needs to be readjusted.To make the interest relations among governments,schools and enterprises during the school-enterprise cooperation process clear and reveal the influencing mechanism of the government’s incentive policy on the pattern of interest distribution,Evolutionary Game Theory was used as the analytic tool to construct an asymmetric game model with incomplete information among governments,schools and enterprises in this paper.From the evolutionary analysis results,it can be seen that the final game result highly depends on the sensitive initial conditions.The relations between initial conditions and thresholds affects the governments’room to implement policies and their ability of defending risks.As administrative departments,the governments should take the initiative to draft flexible and diversified economic incentive policies for enterprises to stimulate the their initiatives to participate in higher vocational education,and improve the industry-education integration in the school-enterprise cooperation so that enterprises can get more additional benefits.And in terms of schools,the governments should implement the policy of carrot and stick to promote their initiatives to deepen the school-enterprise cooperation.In addition,the responsibility subject role of government played in school-enterprise cooperation needs to be enhanced and a good environment for cooperation should be created and maintained.Schools and enterprises should conduct cooperation from limited rational type to a complete one so as to achieve the Pareto optimal equilibrium of the final game.
出处
《高等工程教育研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第5期153-158,共6页
Research in Higher Education of Engineering
基金
2017-2018年度浙江省高校重大人文社科攻关计划项目:高职教育校企合作经济激励政策的演化博弈与利益分配研究(2018QN031)。
关键词
校企合作
激励政策
演化博弈
利益分配
school-enterprise cooperation
incentive policy
evolutionary game
interest distribution
