摘要
在“动态碳税+限额交易”机制下,基于碳资产质押融资,构建了工业共生链中上游制造商、下游制造商以及银行的三方演化博弈模型,研究了政府碳规制政策以及银行决策对上游制造商和下游制造商减排行为的影响。研究表明:碳税水平的上升会使上游制造商减排意愿增加,而使下游制造商的减排意愿下降;较高的碳交易价格有利于工业共生链的形成;银行贷款意愿的增加抑制了上游制造商减排意愿,但却促进了下游制造商的减排意愿;银行监管成本对银行贷款意愿起到负向作用,即银行贷款意愿随着监管成本的增加而下降。研究结论可为政府从共生链的视角制定协同减排碳规制政策提供理论层面的参考。
In the mode of carbon asset pledge financing,based on the“dynamic carbon tax+cap-and-trade”,it built an evolutionary game model with upper middle and downstream manufacturers and bank of the industrial symbiosis chain,then it studied the influence of government carbon regulation policy and bank decision on the emission reduction behavior of upstream and downstream manufacturers.The results show that an increase in the level of carbon tax would increase the willingness of upstream manufacturers to reduce emissions,while reducing the willingness of downstream manufacturers;Higher carbon trading price is conducive to the formation of industrial symbiotic chain.The increased willingness of banks will restrain the upstream manufacturers'willingness to reduce emission,but promote the downstream manufacturers'willingness to reduce emission;Bank supervision costs have a negative effect on banks'willingness to lend,and banks'willingness to lend decreases with the increase of supervision costs.The conclusion can provide a theoretical basis for the government to formulate coordinated carbon emission reduction regulation policies from the perspective of the industrial symbiosis chain.
作者
丁黎黎
张凯旋
王垒
DING Li-li;ZHANG Kai-xuan;WANG Lei(School of Economics,Ocean University of China,Qingdao 266100,China;Institute of Marine Development,Ocean University of China,Qingdao 266100,China)
出处
《研究与发展管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第5期29-41,共13页
R&D Management
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“海洋经济高质量发展路径研究”(19VHQ002)。
关键词
工业共生链
碳减排
动态碳税
演化博弈
industry symbiotic chain
carbon emission reduction
dynamic carbon tax
evolutionary game
