摘要
中国古代的监察制度被视为传统政治结构中皇帝最成功的权谋术之一,是伴随皇权的强化不断发展的。“明主治吏不治民”的统治经验,在君臣百战的权力利害冲突中,通过位卑权重的监察官员加以平衡。自秦代监察制度正式建立后,中国历代监察机构多有沿革,但背后一元化的权力结构模式基本相同。从中国传统社会的政制实践和监察制度发展历程来看,庞大的监察权力系统未必是实现制度理想的最有效方式。监察制度体系的构建不仅要具有形式上的独立性和专门性,更要保证其运行机制的独立性、有效性和稳定性。中国传统监察制度的经验应引起我们对当代监察制度改革具体路径的思考。
The ancient Chinese supervisory system was regarded as one of the emperor’s most successful power tricks in the traditional political structure,and it evolved with the strengthening of the imperial power.The ruling experience of“administering officials without governing the people”is balanced in the conflict of power and interests of the monarchs and ministers through the inferior but powerful supervisory officials.Since the establishment of the Qin Dynasty supervisory system,many supervisory agencies in China have evolved,but the unified power structure model behind them is basically the same.Judging from the practice of the political system and the development of the supervisory system in traditional Chinese society,the huge supervisory power system may not be an effective way to achieve an ideal system.The construction of the supervisory system must not only have the independence and specialty in form,but also ensure the independence,effectiveness and stability of its operating mechanism.The experience of China’s traditional supervisory system draws our attention to the concrete path of contemporary supervision system reform.
作者
赵晓耕
刘盈辛
Zhao Xiaogeng;Liu Yingxin(Renmin University)
出处
《武汉大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第6期150-161,共12页
Wuhan University Journal：Philosophy & Social Science
基金
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(2009JJD820011)。
关键词
传统监察制度
监察机构
权力结构
权力制约
国家监察体制改革
traditional monitoring system
supervisory authority
power structure
power restriction
supervision system reform
