摘要
以企业为主体整合科研院所、高等院校力量,建立创新联合体,有利于打破我国单一主体创新能力不足的困境,提高创新效率,为突破产业关键核心技术、提升产业链基础水平提供新的思路和视角。本文基于博弈论构建重复博弈模型,通过分析创新联合体成员参与联合创新的动机,探究创新联合的动力机制,发现预期合作效益与合作次数,对企业和其他创新主体是否愿意采取联合创新的行为有着显著影响,且创新联合体参与主体在合作研发中的对等投入有利于合作关系的稳定,为提高创新联合体组建水平和稳定参与主体间的合作关系提供了支撑。
Under the current international situation where the United States continues to expand the scope of technology control over China, enterprises and other innovation entities need to strengthen cooperation, effectively improve the depth and efficiency of innovation cooperation, so as to rapidly improve independent innovation capabilities. The United States sanctions against ZTE has further exposed the issue that the core technology in some fields is subject to the control of other countries. The key core technology is an important support for enterprises to break through the technical bottleneck and realize sustainable development and breakthrough development. The breakthrough and acquisition of key core technology requires joint innovation of multiple resources. In 2018, General Secretary Xi Jinping clearly stated at the second meeting of the Central Finance and Economics Committee that leading companies should be supported to integrate the strength of scientific research institutes and universities and establish innovative consortium. This article believes that innovation consortium is different from previous forms of strategic alliances, industry-university-research cooperation, etc., but a new kind of entity organization or equity-related alliance. Each participant should have certain investment in funds, talents, technology, infrastructure and other ways, and form a win-win cooperation mechanism through equity allocation and sharing mechanism.The practice of Jilin Province "New Energy and Intelligent Network Connected Automobile Industry Innovation Consortium", "Pharmaceutical Industry Science and Technology Innovation Consortium", Beijing "Life Science and Health Collaborative Innovation Consortium", and Jiangsu Province "Photovoltaic Industry Innovation Consortium" show that the innovation consortium is conducive to the collaborative tackling of key common technologies, the integration and development of large and medium-sized enterprises and the industrial basic ability improvement.The establishment of an innovation consortium is conducive to breaking the dilemma of insufficient innovation capabilities of a single entity in China, improving innovation efficiency, and providing new ideas and perspectives for breaking through the key core technologies of the industry and improving the basic level of the industrial chain. Based on game theory, this paper constructs a repeated game model, analyzes the motivations of innovation consortium members to participate in joint innovation, explores the dynamic mechanism of innovation alliance. It is found that when the positive feedback of cooperative R&D is large, enterprises are willing to cooperate even if the initiative is small. The number of cooperation determines whether the enterprise is willing to take cooperative R&D behavior. When the number of cooperation is relatively large, there is a relationship of mutual trust between the members of the innovation consortium, which is easier to achieve cooperative R&D. The reciprocal investment of the innovation consortium participants in cooperative R&D is conducive to the stability of the cooperative relationship, and the willingness of enterprises to conduct cooperative R&D increases with the increase in the probability of cooperative behavior by universities and research institutes.From the perspective of encouraging enterprises to actively cooperate with various innovation entities to establish innovation consortium and stabilize the cooperative relationship of innovation consortium, this research proposes policy recommendations from four aspects: establishing restraint mechanisms, strengthening early guidance, improving the policy environment, and connecting innovation system, which provides support for improving the level of innovation consortium and stabilizing the cooperative relationship between participants.
作者
白京羽
刘中全
王颖婕
Bai Jingyu;Liu Zhongquan;Wang Yingjie(Center for Innovation-Driven Development,National Development and Reform Commission,Beijing 100031,China;School of Economics and Management,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China)
出处
《科研管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2020年第10期105-113,共9页
Science Research Management
基金
国家自然科学基金专项项目“2020年基础研究高质量发展的风险监测及应对策略研究”(L1924083)。
关键词
创新联合体
博弈论
动力机制
innovation consortium
game theory
dynamic mechanism
