摘要
农村金融创新与农村金融监管是实现农村金融可持续发展的必然选择,准确认识和处理好两者之间的关系,对实现农村金融可持续发展十分重要.论文首先借助简单博弈论模型,分析出农村金融创新与农村金融监管的关系是静态上的相互促进、相互制约以及动态上的相互演进发展.其次,运用数理分析方法研究了阻碍两者演进发展的风险问题生成机理和传递路径,论证了农村金融机构创新风险主要滋生于农村金融市场泡沫的增加和创新产品利率波动的加大;创新风险的传递路径主要由创新产品及服务、农村金融机构、农村金融市场和农村经济等风险传递主体构成和延伸.最后,对我国加强农村金融创新和农村金融监管提出了对策建议.
Given that fact that innovation and supervision of finance in rurual area is the inevitable choice to realize the sustainable development of rural finance,it is important to correctly and overally understand and handle the relationship between them and the problems facing the co-evolution and to realize the sustainable development of rural finance.This paper first analyzes the relationship between financial innovation and financial regulation in rurual area by means of simple game theory,which is static mutual promotion and mutual restriction,dynamic mutual evolution and development.Secondly,we develop the generation mechanism and transmission path of the risk problems that hinder the evolution and development of them by mathematical analysis and conclude that the innovation risk of rural financial institutions mainly results from the increase of bubble in rural financial market and the fluctuation of interest rate of innovative products.The transfer path of innovation risk is mainly composed and extended by innovative products and services,rural financial institutions,rural financial market and rural economy.Finally,the paper gives suggestion on how to strengthen rural financial innovation and rural financial supervision in China.
作者
聂勇
李清波
NIE Yong;LI Qing-bo
出处
《农村金融研究》
2020年第9期19-25,共7页
Rural Finance Research
基金
国家社科基金一般项目“农户网络借贷模式创新与风险监管研究”(编号:17BJY121)
广西社科基金一般项目“广西农村金融风险管控与金融创新研究”(编号:15BJY009)的资助。
关键词
农村金融创新
农村金融监管
可持续发展
博弈论
创新风险
Rural Financial Innovation
Rural Financial Supervision
Sustainable Development
Game Theory
Innovation Risk
