摘要
关系网络是助推企业金融化的重要因素。文章将企业金融化置于董事网络框架下,分析了企业金融化传染效应及其经济后果。研究发现,当嵌入董事网络时,我国上市企业的金融化具有显著的传染效应。同时,这种传染效应因董事网络联结企业的注册地、行业以及实际控制人类型存在显著的异质性,且经济政策不确定性也在一定程度上加剧了传染效应。进一步研究发现,嵌入董事网络的企业金融化传染效应造成了实业投资率下降,而完善公司治理难以有效缓解这种抑制效应;同时,这种传染效应对企业价值产生了“倒U形”影响。文章的政策含义是,企业应审慎对待董事网络,尤其要慎重学习和模仿联结企业的金融化经验;同时,监管当局可从董事网络入手化解“脱实向虚”问题。
Considering the characteristics of China’s relational society,this paper analyzes why listed companies are keen on financial asset allocation from the perspective of relationship network,an informal institution.No matter from what angle to explore the deep-seated reasons why firms are keen on financial asset allocation,it is difficult for us to bypass two questions:One is why the phenomenon of firm financialization is so common;the other is why the degree of firm financialization is deepening day by day.We will analyze the relationship between the relationship network and the above problems from the following aspects,which is also the logical starting point of this paper:From the perspective of breadth,financialization belongs to the category of investment decision-making,including individual financialization(financialization of a single firm),local financialization(financialization of multiple firms in the same region or industry),and systemic financialization(financialization of firms in all regions or industries),which follows a diffusion path from individual,local,to systemic;from the depth,there are three levels of financialization,namely,low financialization,high financialization,and excessive financialization,which follows a development path from low,high,to excessive.This paper analyzes the contagion effect and economic consequences of firm financialization under the framework of board network.It is found that when embedded in the board network,the financialization of listed companies in China has a significant contagion effect.At the same time,the contagion effect is significantly heterogeneous due to the fact that the board network connects the registered place,industry and actual human type of the firm,and the economic policy uncertainty aggravates the contagion effect to a certain extent.Further research shows that the contagion effect of firm financialization embedded in the board network leads to the decline of industrial investment rate,while the improvement of corporate governance is difficult to effectively alleviate the inhibitory effect;at the same time,the contagion effect has an inverted U-shaped impact on firm value.The direct policy implication of this paper is that firms should treat the board network prudently,especially carefully learning and imitating the financial experience of connecting firms.At the same time,the regulatory authorities can start from the board network to solve the problem of“from real to virtual”.The contribution of this paper is mainly reflected in the following aspects:On the one hand,the existing research mainly analyzes the influencing factors and economic consequences of firm financialization from the perspective of individual,but does not take into account the informal system.We try to analyze the interaction between firms in financialization from the perspective of relationship network,so as to enrich the existing theoretical research.On the other hand,this paper finds that the contagion effect of firm financialization caused by the board network has aggravated the decline of industrial investment rate,which provides new evidence for further evaluating the value of board network.
作者
王营
曹廷求
Wang Ying;Cao Tingqiu(School of Finance,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan 250014,China;School of Economics,Shandong University,Jinan 250100,China)
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第12期152-166,共15页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目(19ZDA091)
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71802116)
教育部人文社科规划青年项目(17YJC630166)
山东省自然科学基金博士项目(ZR2018BG006)
山东省社科规划项目(19CJRJ15)。
关键词
金融化
董事网络
传染效应
实业投资率
企业价值
financialization
board network
contagion effect
real investment
firm value
