摘要
伴随着新一轮科技革命和产业变革,2020年我国提出了“新基建”的发展方向,充电桩产业作为“新基建”的七大产业之一,不仅支持新能源汽车产业升级,更为无线充电、储能、微电网和新能源消纳等新兴产业提供发展空间。因此对于充电桩产业而言,政府的支持作用非常重要,为了有效地探讨政府在充电桩产业的补贴政策效用,促进充电桩产业健康发展,文章基于博弈模型探讨了政府对充电桩运营商与换电站运营商不同的博弈策略演化过程。首先结合我国政府对充电桩产业的补贴方式,将充电桩与换电站的补贴进行归类,将充电桩运营商获得的补贴归为运营补贴,将换电站获得的补贴归为投资额补贴。然后构建了包括政府、运营商和用户三方之间的博弈模型,针对换电站运营商和充电桩运营商两种方式运用逆向归纳法求得子博弈精炼纳什均衡解。通过纳什均衡解可以看到,运营商的最优投资额与最优建设数量均与政府补贴力度呈正相关;当运营商的盈利能力与获得补贴额度增加时,用户对电动汽车的使用意愿增强;政策效果与政府管理效益紧密相关。结论显示:用户与运营商的决策均与运营商的管理效率系数呈负相关,政府补贴政策的效果受其管理效用影响,因此,在政府未来的补贴政策执行阶段,政府需要创新和提升管理效用;政府可以将补贴政策作为充电桩产业发展的撬动点,构建完善的充电基础设施产业生态体系,也是未来政府推进充电桩产业发展的下一个发力点。
With the new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation,China has put forward the direction of‘new infrastructure’in 2020.As one of the seven major industries of the‘new infrastructure’,the charging facility industry not only supports the upgrade of the new energy vehicle industry but also provides developing platforms for emerging industries such as wireless charging,energy storage,smart microgrid,and new energy consumption.Therefore,the government s supporting role is very important for the charging facility industry.In order to effectively explore the effectiveness of the government s subsidy policy in the charging facility industry and promote its healthy development,this article adopted the game model and discussed the government s evolution process of different game strategies between charging facility operators and battery-swap operators.First,China government subsidies for the charging facility industry were classified into charging facilities and battery-swap stations.The subsidies obtained by the charging facility operators were operating subsidies,while those obtained by battery-swap stations were investment subsidies.Second,a game model was constructed involving the government,operators,and users.The model used backward induction to solve the refined Nash equilibrium solution for charging facilities and battery-swap station operators.The Nash equilibrium solution indicated that the optimal investment amount and the battery-swap station quantity of the operator were positively correlated with the government subsidy intensity.When the profitability of the operators increased and the amount of the subsidies increased,the consumers willingness to use electric vehicles increased and the policy effects were closely related to the benefits of government management.The decisions made by either the users or the operators were inversely related to the operators management efficiency.Besides,the effectiveness of the subsidy policy was affected by the effectiveness of government management.Therefore,in the implementation phase of the government s future subsidy policies,the government needs to innovate and improve management effectiveness.The government could use subsidy policies as a driving force for the development of the charging facility industry to build a comprehensive ecosystem of the industry,which is also the next key point for the government to promote the development of the charging facility industry in the future.
作者
岳为众
刘颖琦
童宇
宋泽源
YUE Weizhong;LIU Yingqi;TONG Yu;SONG Zeyuan(School of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Technology,Beijing 100124,China;Beijing Municipal Commission of Housing and Urban-Rural Development,Beijing 101160,China;School of Economics and Management,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China)
出处
《中国人口·资源与环境》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2020年第11期119-126,共8页
China Population,Resources and Environment
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目“技术驱动下的新能源汽车产业商业模式创新研究”(批准号:16AGL004)。
关键词
博弈
新能源汽车
充电基础设施
政府补贴
game theory
new energy vehicle
charging infrastructure
government subsidy
