摘要
具有市场势力的企业面临环境规制时可以通过研发创新实现波特效应,也可以通过转嫁合规成本实现利润最大化。本文利用新《环境保护法》实施这一准自然实验,基于双重差分和三重差分模型系统地评估了环境强监管对具有不同市场势力的上市公司研发创新的影响。研究发现,新《环境保护法》的实施显著促进了企业的研发创新,市场势力本身与企业创新呈现倒“U”型关系,同时市场势力显著抑制了新《环境保护法》的波特效应。
When enterprises with monopoly power are facing environmental regulation,they can realize the Porter effect through innovation,or maximize profits by transferring compliance costs.Based on the data of listed companies,double difference model and triple difference model,this paper systematically evaluates the impact of strong environmental supervision on R&D innovation of listed companies with different market forces by using the quasi natural experiment implemented by the new environmental protection law.The empirical study finds that,firstly,the implementation of the new environmental protection law significantly promotes the R&D innovation of enterprises;secondly,market power and enterprise innovation present an inverted"U";Finally,market forces significantly inhibit the porter effect of the new environmental protection law.
作者
陈屹立
邓雨薇
CHEN Yi-li;DENG Yu-wei(School of Economics,Southwest University of Political Science and Law,Chongqing 401120,China)
出处
《贵州财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第1期30-43,共14页
Journal of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目“环保法规执行体系推动企业绿色发展的机制、效果与完善研究”(18BJL059)
重庆市研究生科研创新项目“环境规制、市场势力与企业创新——来自新《环保法》的证据”(CYS19180)。
关键词
环境规制
市场势力
波特效应
创新
environmental regulation
market power
porter effect
R&D
