摘要
从政府的角度出发,以排污企业作为研究对象,合理改进累计前景理论的价值函数,建立村民参与监督下政府和排污企业的农村环境治理决策行为演化博弈模型,进而得到使排污企业积极治理农村环境的约束条件。在综合考虑双方前景价值感知的基础上引入环境治理补贴,构建环境补贴对排污企业价值感知与环境治理决策行为的影响模型,最后运用系统动力学分析村民参与下政府和排污企业环境治理前景价值感知与治理决策行为。解决了传统博弈论完全理性假设和均衡分析方法的局限性,考虑政府和排污企业前景价值感知与环境治理补贴下积极参与农村环境治理的行为特征与规律,以及村民参与监督对政府和排污企业环境治理决策行为的影响,为构建我国农村环境多主体治理机制提供决策参考。
From the perspective of the government,the paper takes the sewage enterprises as the research object,reasonably improves the value function of the cumulative prospect theory,establishes the evolutionary game model of the rural environmental governance decision-making behavior of the government and the sewage enterprises under the supervision of the villagers’participation,and then obtains the constraint conditions for the sewage enterprises to actively control the rural environment.On the basis of comprehensive consideration of the interests of both parties,environmental subsidies are introduced to build an impact model of environmental subsidies on the behavior of sewage disposal business.Finally,system dynamics is used to analyze the sensitivity of relevant influencing factors.The article has solved the limitation of the traditional game theory’s completely rational assumption and equilibrium analysis method,and has comprehensively and truly considered the characteristics and laws of polluting business’s active participation in environmental rural governance under environmental subsidies and the influence of villagers’participation in supervision,which has provided a reference for the construction of Chinese rural environmental governance mechanism.
作者
汤弘茜
何寿奎
TANG Hongqian;HE Shoukui(School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China)
出处
《生态经济》
北大核心
2021年第2期195-201,共7页
Ecological Economy
基金
国家社会科学基金年度项目“农村环境治理多元主体行为逻辑与政策引导机制研究”(18BJY094)
重庆市社会科学规划一般项目“‘一带一路’公共产品供给机制与风险应对研究”(2017YBGL153)。
关键词
农村环境治理决策
累积前景理论
演化博弈
环境补贴
rural environmental governance decision
cumulative prospect theory
evolutionary game theory
environmental subsidy
