摘要
当企业保持较高的财务杠杆时,来自债权人的压力可能会抑制高管薪酬,从而导致较低的高管业绩-薪酬敏感度,这是因为企业所有者将这样的激励机制作为对债权人的权益保护承诺,避免高管可能出现的风险转移行为.但是,去杠杆政策所导致的融资结构变化可能会使这个情况发生逆转.基于中国A股非金融类上市企业2013—2018年数据进行实证研究,发现:(1)去杠杆政策将会提高企业高管薪酬;(2)相比国有企业,去杠杆政策能够显著提升非国有企业高管的薪酬水平;(3)相比股权结构分散的企业,去杠杆政策能够显著提升股权结构相对集中的企业的高管薪酬;(4)去杠杆政策可以通过财务风险的中介作用来提高高管薪酬.以自由现金流和高管薪酬敏感性为切入点,所进行的理论分析和实证检验,为评价去杠杆政策的效果提供了微观证据,同时为该政策的继续贯彻落实提供了理论参考.
When an enterprise maintains a rather high financial leverage,pressure from creditors may lead to a lower pay for the executives and thus in turn result in a lower performance-pay sensitivity on the part of executives.This is because the owner of the enterprise takes such a incentive mechanism as a promise to guarantee to protect the rights and interests of creditors to prevent risk transfer behavior on the part of executives.However,changes in the financing structure as a result of deleveraging policies could reverse this.An empirical study Based on the data of China’s A-share non-financial listed companies from 2013 to 2018 finds that(1)deleveraging policy may boost corporate executive remuneration;(2)Compared with state-owned enterprises,the deleveraging policy can significantly improve the remuneration of executives in non-state-owned enterprises;(3)Compared with enterprises with a dispersed ownership structure,the deleveraging policy can significantly improve the executives’compensation in enterprises with a relatively concentrated ownership structure;(4)Deleveraging policies can raise executive remuneration through the intermediary function of financial risks.Taking free cash flow and executive remuneration sensitivity as the entry point,this paper conducts a theoretical analysis and empirical test,in hope of providing microscopic evidence for the effect evaluation of the deleveraging policy and theoretical reference for the continued implementation of the policy.
作者
秦海林
白晓旭
QIN Hailin;BAI Xiaoxu(School of Economics and Management, Tiangong University, Tianjin 300387, China)
出处
《内江师范学院学报》
2021年第2期73-90,共18页
Journal of Neijiang Normal University
基金
天津市社科规划项目(TJYY13-019,TJYY17-010)。
关键词
去杠杆政策
高管薪酬
自由现金流
薪酬敏感度
双重差分模型
deleveraging policy
executive remuneration
free cash flow
remuneration sensitivity
double difference model
