摘要
本文以2015—2019年沪深主板上市民营企业为研究对象,分别实证研究了高管薪酬与真实盈余管理、真实盈余管理与审计费用的关系,并将三者放入同一研究体系中研究了高管薪酬的调节效应,结果表明:高管薪酬的提高可以抑制真实盈余管理;真实盈余管理与审计费用显著正相关;另外,高管薪酬会降低真实盈余管理与审计费用之间的相关性,因此,制定合理的薪酬机制十分必要。
Taking the private enterprises on the Shanghai and Shenzhen main boards as the research object from2015 to 2019, the relationship between executive compensation and real earnings management, real earnings management and audit fees was studied separately, and the three were put into the same research system. The moderating effect of executive compensation shows that: the increase in executive compensation can inhibit real earnings management;there is a significant positive correlation between real earnings management and audit fees;in addition, executive compensation will reduce the correlation between real earnings management and audit fees.Therefore, it is necessary to develop a reasonable compensation mechanism.
作者
钱红光
程熠琳
QIAN Hong-guang;CHENG Yi-lin(School of Economics and Management,Hubei University of Technology,430000,Wuhan,Hubei,China)
出处
《特区经济》
2021年第1期126-130,共5页
Special Zone Economy
关键词
高管薪酬
真实盈余管理
审计费用
executive compensation
real earnings management
audit fees
