摘要
由于政府、企业、居民三个利益主体在跨区域森林保护生态补偿过程中,都持有各自的利益诉求,并且会发生行为导向冲突,致使跨区域森林保护生态补偿机制实施具有一定难度,为此提出跨区域森林保护生态补偿的演化博弈分析。分析了政府、企业、居民三个博弈主体间的利益关系和逻辑关系,明确博弈主体之间关系;以演化博弈论作为理论依据,以“谁破坏谁补偿,谁损失谁获得补偿”为原则,搭建了演化博弈模型,明确划分三个博弈主体的责任和权益;在此基础上,求解了跨区域森林保护生态补偿演化稳定策略,通过计算各个策略的期望收益值和平均收益值,选择出最优跨区域森林保护生态补偿策略,实现博弈主体利益最大化,以此完成了跨区域森林保护生态补偿的演化博弈分析。
In the process of ecological compensation for cross regional forest protection,the government,enterprises and residents have their own interest demands,and there will be behavior oriented conflict,which makes the implementation of ecological compensation mechanism for cross regional forest protection difficult,therefore,this paper puts forward the evolutionary game analysis of ecological compensation for cross regional forest protection.This paper analyzes the interest relationship and logical relationship among the government,enterprises and residents,and clarifies the relationship between the game subjects;taking the evolutionary game theory as the theoretical basis and the principle of“Who damages who compensates,who loses who gets compensation”,an evolutionary game model is built to clearly divide the responsibilities and rights of the three game players;on this basis,the evolutionary stability strategy of ecological compensation forcross regional forest protection is solved by calculating the expected and average return values of each strategy,the optimal ecological compensation strategy for cross regional forest protection is selected to maximize the interests of the game players,so as to complete the evolutionary game analysis of ecological compensation for cross regional forest protection.
作者
张薇薇
崔华蕾
王海越
Zhang Wei-wei;CUI Hua-lei;WANG Hai-yue(Hebei Wulingshan National Nature Reserve Management Center,Chengde Hebei 067399,China)
出处
《青海农林科技》
2021年第1期57-59,68,共4页
Science and Technology of Qinghai Agriculture and Forestry
关键词
跨区域
森林保护
生态补偿
演化博弈分析
Cross regional
Forest protection
Ecological compensation
Evolutionary game analysis
