摘要
由于博弈双方(环保监督机构和排污企业)在博弈过程中具有不完全信息及博弈参与人有限理性的特征,博弈双方均以追求自身利益最大化为目标.基于此特点本文运用演化博弈理论,在有无政府主动干预的两种状态下进行监察分析,在博弈模型中引入企业综合声誉损失因子、社会污染事件概率因子以提高模型精度.然后运用常微分方程数值解理论对模型中的复制动态方程进行求解,根据各均衡点雅可比矩阵的特征值求得模型的演化稳定策略(Evolutionary Stable Strategy,ESS),在演化稳定策略中寻找博弈各方的纳什均衡,随后讨论了模型中综合声誉损失因子及各变量与现实治污策略的相关性及可行性,以便为监察部门提供相对合理的建议和监督调控策略.
Due to the characteristics of incomplete information in gaming process and finite rationality of game participants,we have established two types of monitoring game models to simulate and regulate air pollution monitoring based on the evolutionary game theory.The dynamic equation of the game model was solved and the evolution strategy of the monitoring system was obtained.In the evolutionary stable strategy,we found the influencing factors of Nash equilibrium,then we have provided the corresponding suggestions and measures for the supervisory department to regulate the behavior of the pollution enterprises.
作者
李鑫
马国顺
朱熙
岳高峰
Li Xin;Ma Guoshun;Zhu Xi;Yue Gaofeng(School of Science,Xi’an Aeronautical University,710077,Xi’an,China;College of Mathematics and Statistics,Northwest Normal University,730070,Lanzhou,China;School of Mathematics and Statistics,Northwestern Polytechnical University,710129,Xi’an,China;Linxia Bureau of Meteorology,731100,Linxia,Gansu,China)
出处
《山东师范大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
2021年第1期44-53,共10页
Journal of Shandong Normal University(Natural Science)
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71061012)
陕西省教育厅科研计划资助项目(18JK0407).
关键词
演化博弈
演化稳定策略
大气污染
排污监管
evolutionary game
Evolutionary Stable Strategy(ESS)
air quality
pollution supervision
