摘要
建立博弈模型,探讨技术革新认知差异情形下,外部技术创新者向寡占竞争格局的生产企业授权生产新产品专利的最优决策问题。研究发现,创新授权者关于新产品市场的认知劣势使固定收费契约不具备完全优于特许权收费契约的绝对优势;在双重收费契约下,专利人授权对象选择因认知差异影响,由排他性授权向非排他性授权决策转变;认知差异性削弱了创新企业市场势力,从而提高特许权收费契约优势,而拍卖、股权投资等有助于创新企业克服认知劣势。据此,建议创新企业明晰创新专利长期回报,综合搭配应用多种授权契约;以非排他性授权策略配合特许权收费、双重收费和股权投资等契约模式,实现技术交易产业链激励共容下的利润最大化,促进技术创新传播应用,提高社会福利水平。
Considering the Cognitive difference of innovation degree,this paper builds a model to study the licensing contracts mechanism,which an outside innovator sells its horizontal product innovation to one or two firms who compete a la Cournot Under incomplete information.It finds that fixed-fee contract is not always superior than royalty contract to the licensor considering the cognitive disadvantage.In two-part tariff contract,cognitive difference distorts the innovator’s choice from exclusive licensing to non-exclusive licensing.Cognitive difference weakens the licensor's market power,which enhances the advantage of royalty contract.Auction and equity investment contracts are helpful to avoid the influence of incomplete information.It is suggested that the innovation patentee should clarify the long-term return and apply a variety of licensing contracts.To maximize profit with the technology industry chain mutual inclusion of incentives,non-exclusive licensing strategy is adopted to cooperate with royalty,two-part tariff,equity investment contracts,which promotes the application of technological innovation,and improves social welfare.
作者
王君美
王巧玲
杨咏东
Wang Junmei;Wang Qiaoling;Yang Yongdong(School of Economics and Management,Yantai University;School of Opto-electronic Information science and Technology,Yantai University, Yantai 264005,China)
出处
《科技进步与对策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第7期134-140,共7页
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71402158)
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71671117)。
关键词
新产品创新
认知差异
技术授权契约
Horizontal Product Innovation
Cognitive Difference
Technology Licensing Contract
