摘要
中美规则博弈从本质上来说就是发展利益、发展模式和发展主导权之争。由于美国把中国视为战略竞争对手,因此从战略上遏制中国发展的意图显而易见。而今天的规则博弈又高度涉及彼此国内制度,中国也绝不会放弃自身发展权和发展道路的选择,因此中美规则博弈将在较长时间处于非合作博弈状态。从双方博弈筹码来看,美国在科技领域占优,中国在国内政治稳定性上占优,双方在国内市场规模上基本持平,但时间有利中国。双方非合作博弈的外化表现就是围绕“非市场经济国家”和“发展中国家地位”在世界贸易组织(WTO)改革方向上的根本分歧、在美国主导的区域和双边规则中的强排他性和“去中国化”以及通过各种污名化直接发难中国体制。中美非合作博弈对国际经贸规则体系的走向产生重要影响,主要表现为:国际经贸规则体系更趋碎片化、世界可能形成两种导向的规则体系、区域化规则体系将成为主导模式。对中国来说,在不可能改变美国的情况下,最好的战略选择就是在做好自己事情的基础上,以更加包容的制度平衡方式化解美国排他性制度制衡方式带来的压力和挑战。
The rules game between China and the United States is,by its nature,a race of interests,patterns,and dominance in the process of development.Taking China as a strategic rival,the U.S.never hides its intention to curb China’s development.As today’s rules game is highly related to each other’s domestic institutions,and China will never give up its right to development and its chosen development path,the ChinaU.S.rules game will be in a noncooperative game for a long time.Weighing the two sides’game chips,the United States leads in the field of science and technology,China leads in its domestic political stability,the two sides are evenly matched in the current domestic market size but the time is favorable to China.The externalization of the noncooperative game between the two sides is centered on the fundamental differences on the issues of“nonmarket economy countries”and“developing country status”in the direction of WTO reform,as well as strong exclusiveness and“delinking with China”in the regional and bilateral rules dominated by the United States.This noncooperative game between China and the United States has farreaching implications on the trend of the international trade and economic rules system,mainly as follows:the international economic and trade rules system is becoming more fragmented,the world may form two parallel rules systems with different orientations,and the regional rules systems will dominate the direction of new rules.For China,if it is impossible to change the U.S.,the best strategic option is to do its own things best,and on this basis,tries to adopt a more inclusive and balanced institutional approach to alleviate the pressures and challenges posed by America’s exclusive institutional balancing.
作者
竺彩华
刘让群
ZHU Caihua;LIU Rangqun(University of International Business and Economics,Beijing 100029,China;University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100049,China)
出处
《太平洋学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第4期1-14,共14页
Pacific Journal
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目“国际经贸规则重构方向研究”(20AJL008)的阶段性研究成果。
关键词
拜登政府
非合作博弈
国际经贸规则体系
排他性制度制衡
包容性制度平衡方式
Biden administration
non⁃cooperative game
international trade and economic rules system
exclusive institutional balancing
inclusive and balanced institutional approach
