摘要
普通公司法视域下,对外部董事独立性的探讨较多集中于其与公司内部管理层的相对隔离,这无力促进本土化殊为显著的国有资本投资运营公司外部董事与政府股东的关系界分。而政策文件中对国有资本投资运营公司外部董事选任权的割裂,暗含着其可能独立于政府股东的制度安排。在既有法律规则下,无论何种授权经营体制,政府股东均可借由掌控外部董事掌握国有资本投资运营公司治理权。基于更加宏观的法律机制视角,明确外部董事独立性的缺失肇因,为实现改革目标、迎合私法关系、移植淡马锡经验,有必要钩沉外部董事面向出资人代表机构的独立性需求,逐步明晰国有资产监管权力边界,并将降低改革的政治交易成本纳入考量,建基于此,进一步提出全面的修法建议,以破解外部董事的构成性迷思与建设性困惑。
From the perspective of common company law,the discussion on the independence of external directors is mainly focused on the relative isolation between them and the internal management of the company,which cannot promote localization as a significant boundary between the external directors and the government shareholders of state-owned capital investment and operation companies.However,the separation of the right to elect the external directors of state-owned capital investment and operation companies in the policy documents implies that it may be independent of the institutional arrangements of government shareholders.Under the existing legal rules,no matter what kind of authorized operation system,government shareholders can control the governance of state-owned capital investment and operation companies by controlling external directors.Based on a more macro perspective of legal mechanism,this paper clarifies the reasons for the lack of independence of external directors.In order to achieve the goal of reform,cater to private law relations,and transplant Temasek′s experience,it is necessary to deepen the independence needs of external directors for investor representative institutions,gradually clarify the power boundary of state-owned assets supervision,and take into account the reduction of political transaction costs of reform.Based on this,this paper further puts forward comprehensive suggestions on amending the law,in order to solve the constructive puzzles of external directors.
作者
王怀勇
王鹤翔
WANG Huai-yong;WANG He-xiang(Economic Law School, Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Chongqing 401120,China)
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第3期102-113,共12页
Commercial Research
基金
重庆市哲学社会科学规划重大项目,项目编号:2018TBWT-ZD06
西南政法大学校级研究生科研创新项目,项目编号:2019XZXS-042。
关键词
授权经营体制改革
国有资本投资运营公司
外部董事
独立性
淡马锡模式
authorized operation system reform
state-owned capital investment and operation company
external directors
independence
Temasek model
