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中央环保督察效用逻辑中的地方政府环境治理行为调适 被引量:31

Utility logic of central environmental protection inspections and local governments’behavior adaption
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摘要 中央环保督察作为国家生态文明体制机制改革的重要举措,是环境治理领域的重要制度创新,对于改进地方环境治理,提升环境绩效具有重要作用。近年来,环保督察在全国范围内全面展开并取得显著成绩,但现有研究却缺少对环保督察运作与效用逻辑的深入研究。文章采用扎根理论的研究方法,对第一轮中央环保督察31个省份对外公布的《贯彻落实中央环境保护督察反馈意见整改情况》进行三级编码,构建了一个“压力-调适-产出”模型,以阐释中央环保督察的压力传导与地方政府的行为调适,在此基础上勾勒出中央环保督察的效用逻辑。研究发现:中央环保督察在实施过程中,层层传导出强制性与规范性制度压力。首先,通过“一竿子插到底”的下沉督察、督察组的“高配”设置以及整改的“双重监督”体系,对地方政府传导出服从、问责、整改三重强制性制度压力;其次,通过环保督察背后所彰显的党中央对生态文明建设与环境保护工作的高度重视,对地方政府形成规范性压力。面对环保督察的制度压力,地方政府从“内部与外部”“纵向与横向”四个维度积极调适环境治理行为。通过对内调整注意力与资源分配,对外吸纳社会与市场力量,横向整合部门资源,纵向贯彻环保压力,实现了环境治理多元共治、协调联治、上下齐治的新格局。正是在环保督察压力下的地方政府的行为调适,推动了环境治理绩效的改进与环境保护长效机制的建立。在既有概念模型的基础上,为进一步发挥制度效力,应从建立容错机制、周期性督察嵌入常规环境治理体系等维度持续完善环境保护督察制度。 As an important measure of national ecological civilization system and mechanism reform, central environmental protection inspection is a significant institutional innovation in the field of environmental governance, and plays an important role in the improvement of local environmental governance and its performance. Over the past several years, the Chinese central government has conducted environmental inspections nationwide and achieved remarkable results, but few studies have investigated the operation of these environmental inspections and their utility logic. Based on the grounded theory, this article analyzed the 31 provincial rectification texts through three-level coding and built a ‘pressure-adaption-outcome’ model to explain the pressure transmission of the central environmental inspections and the local governments’ behavior adaption. On this basis, this article outlined the utility logic of these environmental inspections. The results showed that coercive pressure and normative pressure were continually transmitted in the process of the inspections. Through the ‘down to the grass-roots level’ inspections, the ‘high allocation’ setting of inspection section and the ‘double supervision’ system of rectification, the inspection conducted three forms of coercive pressure including obedience, accountability and rectification on local governments. Secondly, behind the action of environmental inspection, it showed that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China attaches great importance to ecological civilization construction and environmental protection, thus causing normative pressure on local governments. In order to respond the top-down pressure, the local governments adjusted their behaviors from four dimensions of ‘internal and external’ and ‘vertical and horizontal’. By adjusting attention and resource allocation internally, absorbing the social and market power externally, integrating departmental resources horizontally and implementing the pressure vertically, a new pattern of multi faceted, coordinated, top-down governance was realized. Because of the inspection pressure, local governments’ adaption promotes the improvement of environmental performance and the establishment of long-term mechanism of environmental protection. Based on the existing concept model, in order to further enhance the effectiveness, the paper suggests that the governments should establish a fault-tolerant mechanism and embed periodic inspections into the bureaucratic system to improve the environmental protection inspection system.
作者 韩艺 谢婷 刘莎莎 HAN Yi;XIE Ting;LIU Shasha(School of Public Administration,Nanchang University,Nanchang Jiangxi 330031,China;Center for Anti-Corruption Studies,Nanchang University,Nanchang Jiangxi 330031,China;School of Publie Administration,Central China Normal University,Wuhan Hubei 430074,China)
出处 《中国人口·资源与环境》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2021年第5期88-96,共9页 China Population,Resources and Environment
基金 国家社会科学基金项目“强镇改革进程中的镇级政府权能关系耦合及优化研究”(批准号:19BZZ049) 江西省研究生创新课题“江西生态文明建设考核责任体系研究”(批准号:YC2019-B024)。
关键词 环保督察 环境治理 扎根理论 压力传导 行为调适 environmental protection inspection environmental governance grounded theory pressure conduction behavior adaption
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