摘要
在竞争企业具有服务差异化的背景下,研究一种定价歧视策略—–基于行为的定价(behavior-based pricing, BBP).采用博弈论方法构建两周期动态定价模型,通过价格和利润的对比分析进一步探讨服务水平差异化企业最优定价策略,最后分析BBP与服务差异化的交互作用.主要研究结论如下:1)服务差异化程度和相对服务成本两大因素交互影响着企业的最优定价策略.具体地,服务差异化程度较低(高)且相对服务成本较小(大)时,竞争企业均不采用(采用) BBP;服务差异化程度较低(高)但服务提升成本较大(小)时,竞争企业存在混合战略纳什均衡,双方有一定概率采用BBP. 2)混合战略纳什均衡情形下, BBP导致的激烈价格竞争并不总是损害竞争双方的利润.当服务差异化程度较低且服务提升成本较大时,高服务水平企业反而能在这种价格竞争中实现利润增加. 3)当服务差异化程度较高且相对服务成本较大时, BBP与服务差异化的交互作用能够实现服务差异化企业利润的帕累托改进,实现双赢的局面.
This paper studies a pricing discrimination strategy of competing firms with service differentiation-behaviorbased pricing(BBP). We use game theory to construct a two-period dynamic pricing model. Through the comparative analysis of prices and profits, we explore firms’ optimal pricing strategy. We analyze the interaction between BBP and service differentiation. Main conclusions are as follows: 1) Two major factors, service differentiation and relative service cost, interactively affect firms’ optimal pricing strategy. Specifically, when the degree of service differentiation is low(high) and the relative service cost is small(large), competing firms don’t adopt(or, adopt) BBP. When the degree of service differentiation is low(high) but the relative service cost is large(small), competing firms have mixed strategic Nash equilibrium, and both parties have a certain probability of adopting BBP. 2) In the case of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, the fierce price competition caused by BBP does not always harm both competitors’ profits. When the degree of service differentiation is low and the relative service cost is large, high-service-level firms can gain more profits. 3)When the degree of service differentiation is high and the relative service cost is relatively large, the interaction between BBP and service differentiation can realize the Pareto improvement of profits for comepeting firms and they can achieve a win-win situation.
作者
马东升
宋华明
黄甫
MA Dong-sheng;SONG Hua-ming;HUANG Fu(School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Science and Technology,Nanjing 210094,China)
出处
《控制与决策》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2021年第7期1754-1762,共9页
Control and Decision
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71172105,71571102)
江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划项目(KYCX18_0485)。
关键词
基于行为的定价
服务差异化
动态定价
定价歧视
战略顾客行为
纳什均衡
behavior-based pricing
service differentiation
dynamic pricing
price discrimination
strategic customer behavior
Nash equilibrium
