摘要
【目的/意义】在COVID-19疫情背景下,出现了许多影响网络环境和社会秩序的网络谣言,研究与谣言传播相关的群体对现实社会具有重要的意义。【方法/过程】文章通过对重大疫情下网络谣言等理论知识的研究,构建了政府、网络运营商和造谣者三方演化博弈模型,根据前景理论将感知价值和实际价值的差值带入三方演化博弈模型,优化模型的实际意义,并通过系统动力学软件进行仿真模拟。【结果/结论】三方博弈能否到达最优稳定点仅与造谣者的感知价值的敏感度有关,且随着感知价值敏感度的变化三方博弈结果将会出现不稳定或稳定在其他非最优稳定点上两种情况。最后对提出网络谣言管控的相关建议。【创新/局限】文章的创新之处在于在演化博弈模型当中加入前景理论与传统的期望效用理论,增加了决策者的理性不足和偏好两方面的考虑,更加贴合舆情的实际情况。
【Purpose/significance】In the context of the covid-19 epidemic, there are many network rumors that affect the network environment and social order. It is of great significance to study the groups related to the spread of rumors in the real society.【Method/process】Based on the study of theoretical knowledge of network rumor under major epidemic, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, network operator and rumor maker. According to the prospect theory, the difference between perceived value and actual value is brought into the tripartite evolutionary game model to optimize the practical significance of the model, and simulation is carried out through system dynamics software.【Result/conclusion】Whether the three-party game can reach the optimal stable point is only related to the sensitivity of the rumor’s perceived value, and with the change of the sensitivity of the perceived value, the results of the three-party game will be unstable or stable at other non-optimal stable points. Finally, the paper puts forward some suggestions on the control of network rumors.【Innovation/limitation】The innovation of the article lies in the addition of prospect theory and traditional expected utility theory to the evolutionary game model, which increases the rationality and preference of decision makers, and is more in line with the actual situation of public opinion.
作者
胡欢
郭晓剑
梁雁茹
HU Huan;GUO Xiao-jian;LIANG Yan-ru(School of Economics and Management,Jiangxi University of Science and Technology,Ganzhou 341000,China)
出处
《情报科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第7期45-53,共9页
Information Science
