摘要
发展绿色建筑是减少温室气体排放的有效途径之一。基于微观市场中绿色建筑和传统建筑市场容量有限的特征,结合共生理论与博弈支付矩阵,构建了绿色建筑与传统建筑的独立共生密度博弈模型;在分析模型稳定后运用系统动力学软件仿真了博弈双方数量的动态变化特征。研究结果表明:模型存在唯一的共生稳定点,模型的稳定条件密切相关于绿色建筑与传统建筑的博弈支付矩阵,与绿色建筑和传统建筑的净复制率无关;政策激励的有效性与微观主体的行为选择密切相关。将中国绿色建筑的实际数据应用本模型进行仿真,结果表明模型可有效揭示和解释中国绿色建筑和传统建筑的共生博弈发展过程。模型和模型仿真结果可有效地为促进绿色建筑的发展提供技术支持和理论依据。
Green construction is an important direction for the future of the construction industry,while developing green buildings is an effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.Designing an incentive mechanism for green building projects is one of the main contents of project management research.However,traditional game models or evolutionary game models cannot consider the symbiotic changes of the number of different populations at the same time when studying the mechanism of the interaction between them.Aiming to solve this problem on the basis of the density game theory by taking into account the limited capacity for green and traditional buildings in the micro-market,the symbiosis equation and game payoffmatrix for greenand traditional building projects are combined,and an independent symbiosis density game model of green and traditional buildings is proposed.The stability of the model is analyzed using the stability theory of ordinary differential equations.Furthermore,the dynamic characteristics of different populations in the game model considering the payoffmatrix are simulated using the system dynamics softwareVensim.It is discovered that there is a unique symbiotic stability point in the model,which is related to the market capacity and game payoffmatrix.The stability condition of our model is closely relevant to the payoffmatrix for green and traditional buildings,but has nothing to do with the net replication rate of green and traditional buildings.The effectiveness of policy incentives is closely related to the behavior choice bythe micro agents.The simulation results based on the realcase from China show that the model can reveal and explain the symbiotic developing process for green and traditional buildings in China.The model and simulation results can also provide effective technical support and theoretical basis for promoting the development of green buildings,and can offer a good reference for other decision-making problems that need to consider both population symbiosis and mutual games.
作者
黄定轩
李树良
吴永娇
卢锐
HUANG Ding-xuan;LI Shu-liang;WU Yong-jiao;LU Rui(School of Management,Chongqing University of Technology,Chongqing 400054,China;School of Business,Guilin University of Technology,Guilin 541004,China;Westminster Business School,the University of Westminster,London,NW15LS,UK;School of Economics&Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China;Economics and Management School,Hangzhou Normal University,Hangzhou 311121,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2021年第8期94-105,共12页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71662008,41761112)
四川省百人计划项目(川组通[2012]142号)
重庆理工大学科研启动基金资助项目(2019ZD128)
重庆市教委人文社会科学研究项目(21SKGH176)。
关键词
绿色建筑
密度博弈
增量收益
增量成本
政策激励
仿真
green buildings
density game
incremental revenue
incremental costs
policy incentive
simulation
