摘要
产能过剩扭曲了资源配置,而中央和地方的产业政策具有两种不同的引导资源配置的逻辑。本文以中国2008—2018年制造业上市公司为研究样本,以治理产能过剩为目标、比较优势为索引,探讨了中央和地方产业政策的协调机制。研究结果表明:地方独立制定的产业政策与追随中央制定的产业政策均可以提升企业产能利用率,但是前者的边际作用更大且顺应了比较优势。在央地两级产业政策的空间适用性方面,两种产业政策组合在不同地区分组、政府压力分组和市场化分组中,实现了不同的治理效果。地方政府压力越小、市场化程度越高,治理产能过剩的央地产业政策将更加协调,更能遵循比较优势路径。
Overcapacity has distorted the allocation of resources,and the central and local industrial policies have two different logics for guiding the allocation of resources.With the goal of controlling overcapacity and the index of comparative advantage,this article uses China’s 2008-2018 listed manufacturing companies as a research sample and discusses the coordination mechanism of central and local industrial policies.The research results show that:both locally formulated industrial policies and following those formulated by the central government can increase the utilization rate of enterprise capacity,but the former has a greater marginal effect and conforms to comparative advantages.The article further studies the spatial applicability of the central and local two-level industrial policies,and finds that the two types of industrial policy combinations achievs different governance effects in different regional groups,government pressure groups,and market-oriented groups.The lower the pressure of local governments and the higher the degree of marketization,the central and local industrial policies to control overcapacity will be more coordinated and follow the path of comparative advantage.
作者
江三良
赵梦婵
JIANG Sanliang;ZHAO Mengchan(Academy of Strategies for Innovation and Development,Anhui University,Heifei 230601,China)
出处
《当代经济科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第5期59-70,共12页
Modern Economic Science
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“长江经济带城市群联动发展对区域一体化的影响作用及政策选择研究”(19BJL051)
安徽大学区域经济与城市发展研究院“长三角产业政策与经济‘脱实向虚’研究”项目(2020)。
关键词
产业政策
比较优势
产能过剩
资源配置
地方政府
industrial policy
comparative advantage
overcapacity
resource allocation
local government
