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政府创业投资引导基金激励监督策略分析

Analysis of the Incentive and Supervisory Strategies for Government Venture Capital Guide Fund
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摘要 【目的/意义】受托管理机构的寻租行为会导致政府创业投资引导基金的投资运作偏离预定的政策性目标,完善对受托管理机构的激励监督机制,防范道德风险的发生,对于确保引导基金投资运作的合规性具有重要意义。【设计/方法】引入监督成本和惩罚函数,并将其植入Holmstrom-Milgrom线性契约激励模型,构建了一个针对受托管理机构寻租行为的激励监督模型。【结论/发现】最优激励水平和监督力度一方面受政府与引导基金自身特点的影响,包括政府的监督成本、惩罚力度和引导基金所处市场环境的不确定性,另一方面也与受托管理机构的履约成本、寻租成本和风险偏好有关。政府应在综合考虑这些参数的影响的基础上制定激励监督策略。进一步地分析发现,单独采用激励或监督策略并不能取得最优的治理效果,只有将两种策略结合起来才能更有效地减少寻租行为,降低委托代理成本,实现政府收益的最大化。 [Purposes/Significance]Rent-seeking behaviors of entrusted agencies will cause the investment operation of the Government Venture Capital Guide Fund to deviate from the predetermined policy objectives.Improving the incentive and supervisory mechanism to prevent moral hazards of entrusted agencies is of great significance to ensure the investment operation of the Guide Fund meets regulatory requirements.[Designs/Methodology]By introducing the supervisory cost and penalty function,and combining them with Holmstrom-Milgrom’s linear incentive model,an incentive and supervisory model for rent-seeking behaviors of entrusted agencies is established.[Findings/Conclusions]On the one hand,the optimal level of incentive and supervision is affected by the characteristics of government and the Guide Fund,including the supervisory cost of government,punishment for rent-seeking behaviors and the uncertainty of market environment of the Guide Fund;on the other hand,it is also related to the performance cost,rent-seeking cost and risk preference of entrusted agencies.The government should formulate incentive and supervisory strategies on the basis of comprehensive consideration of the impact of these parameters.Further analysis shows that the governance effect achieved by the incentive or supervisory strategies alone is not optimal.However,combining the two strategies can effectively reduce rent-seeking behaviors,decrease principal-agent cost and maximize government revenue.
作者 王斌 WANG Bin(University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100039 China)
出处 《电子科技大学学报(社科版)》 2021年第5期49-59,共11页 Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(Social Sciences Edition)
基金 北京市社会科学基金项目(19ZDA12).
关键词 政府创业投资引导基金 受托管理机构 寻租行为 激励机制 监督机制 government venture capital guide fund entrusted agency rent-seeking behavior incentive mechanism supervision mechanism
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