摘要
郁振华和黄勇都认为道德命题知识不具有实践能动性,而王阳明的“良知”具有实践性,因此“良知”不是命题知识。两位先生分别把王阳明的“良知”诠释为能力之知和动力之知,但如此一来,“知而不行”就只是一种认知缺陷,而不是道德缺陷,即只具有道德命题知识,而没有实践性道德知识;要做到“知行合一”,道德主体要在命题知识的基础上“别立个心”以获得实践性道德知识。道德能力之知与道德动力之知的概念也抹杀了信念与知识的分别,因此许多能够用“道德信念”解释的道德现象,是道德能力之知和道德动力之知难以解释的。为了说明“良知”的实践能动性,我们只需要放弃道德命题知识不具有实践能动性的观点,而不需要另立一种自成一类的道德知识。
Modern scholars Yu Zhenhua and Huang Yong both believe that moral propositional knowledge has no practical initiative,while Wang Yangming's notion of liangzhi is knowledge with practical initiative.Therefore,Yu and Huang believe that liangzhi is not propositional knowledge.Yu interpreted liangzhi as“knowing how”,and Huang interpreted it as“knowing to”.But if they are correct,then“knowing without doing”is only an epistemological defect,not a moral one.If we want to achieve“unity of knowledge and action”,we need transform“knowing that”into“knowing how”or“knowing to”.The two scholars'arguments also ignore the important distinction between belief and knowledge.There are many moral phenomena that can be explained by“moral belief”are difficult to explain by“knowing how”and“knowing to”.
出处
《文史哲》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第6期136-143,165,共9页
Literature,History,and Philosophy
基金
陕西省社会科学基金项目“元伦理学视域下的阳明心学研究”(2019C005)的阶段性成果。
