摘要
自赖尔作出两种知识区分以来,道德知识的归类多了一个新的区分向度。在此区分向度下,郁振华与黄勇两人在对"良知"的归类问题上有着道德的"能力之知"与"动力之知"的争论。溯因分析表明,"郁、黄之争"可归因于双方在具体区分向度上有所差异,在"能力之知"概念理解上存在分歧,以及持反理智主义立场所导致的混乱。争论中两人可能存在着误把良知当作纯粹的知态概念、动力来源交代不清、忽略良知与命题性知识的密切关联等问题。通过质疑赖尔知识区分的反理智主义立场的正当性,可主张在理智主义立场下进行道德知识的归类:将道德知识理解为一种"谱系式"的知识概念,并把不同形态的道德知识统一在可"还原"为命题性知识的"Knowing-Wh"知识形式之下。如是可完成道德知识的新归类,以及对郁、黄之争的消解。
Ever since Gilbert Ryle made the distinction between two kinds of knowledge,the classification of moral knowledge has gained a new differentiating dimension.In this dimension,Yu Zhenhua and Huang Yong debated the boundaries of these two kinds of knowledge in the effort to classify Wang Yangming’s notion of liangzhi(moral knowledge,良知).Yu claims that it should be classified as"moral knowing how"as it satisfies Ryle’s characterization of knowing how,while Huang holds that liangzhi should be classified as"knowing to"because of its unique motivating properties.Abductive reasoning shows that the debate between them can be attributed to three points:first,their differences in the specific differentiating dimension;second,their divergences in the understanding of knowing how,which involves the concept of"disposition",the extension of knowing how,and the attribution of liangzhi;and third,the confusion caused by the standpoint of anti-intellectualism,which means knowledge can be distinguished as independent types due to their own characteristics.To reveal the dilemma faced by Yu and Huang in the debate,this essay discusses three issues that need further response or clarification from the standpoint of anti-intellectualism:the definition of liangzhi,the source of motivation,and the relationship between liangzhi and"moral knowing that".We can find that1)liangzhi is a complex,thick concept that integrates knowledge,emotion and volition,although Yu and Huang seem to mistake it for a single pure epistemic concept;2)their explanations of the source of motivation are obscure;and 3)liangzhi,no matter as"moral knowing how"or"knowing to",is based on"moral knowing that",and shows close correlation with it,which is different from the independence of different types of knowledge from the anti-intellectualist perspective.To sum up,we can reasonably speculate that the debate between Yu and Huang arises from their anti-intellectualist stances and their attempt to explain the thick concept of liangzhi by a single type of knowledge.This essay reveals that the distinction Ryle made in criticizing the intellectualist legend is not primarily the distinction between knowing how and knowing that,rather,the distinction between these two kinds of knowledge is not necessary,and Ryle as well has problems in his related expressions.By doing so,this essay has questioned the reasonability of Ryle’s anti-intellectualist position in his distinction of knowledge,and thus the foundation of the dispute between Yu and Huang has itself been shaken.This essay then advocates that moral knowledge should be classified under the intellectualist stance.At last,a scheme of"Knowing-Wh"is proposed,in which moral knowledge would be understood as a"genealogical"concept,and different types of moral knowledge could be unified under the form of"Knowing-Wh"because of its thickness,inclusiveness,and other advantages over the single type of knowledge advocated by antiintellectualism.Thus a new classification of moral knowledge is proposed.
出处
《哲学动态》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第10期88-98,128,共12页
Philosophical Trends
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目“哲学直觉作为证据的合理性研究”(20BZX102)阶段性成果。
