摘要
数字经济有着强大的市场穿透力,能够在短时间内覆盖到社会的各个角落。其自然演化的试错过程可能会带来巨大的社会成本,因此,需要对数字经济进行市场设计。然而,目前对数字经济的市场设计还缺乏系统的研究。本文从市场设计的组成部分--拍卖和匹配机制设计两个方面进行展开,在梳理数字经济市场设计现状基础上,探讨二者发挥的作用及需要作出的改进。研究表明,拍卖和匹配机制设计在数字经济中发挥着重要作用:(1)克服非现场交易(特别是非现场讨价还价交易)的不便,适应数字平台交易的约束;(2)提升交易质量和透明度,维护市场的公平交易;(3)快速生成较为合理的交易价格,使得交易可以瞬间实现;(4)降低市场参与者信息收集与信息处理的成本,提升市场活跃度。同时,在市场不能发挥作用的地方,需借助政府"有形之手",通过行政手段和法律手段为数字经济保驾护航。此外,未来需针对数字经济的特点设计更加有效的拍卖机制,防范密封拍卖中的作弊行为,并加快动态匹配的研究进度。
The digital economy has strong market penetration and can cover all corners of society in a short time.The trial-and-error process of its natural evolution may bring huge social costs,so it is necessary to design the market in the digital economy.However,there is still a lack of systematic research on the market design of the digital economy.This paper is carried out from the two aspects of market design:auction mechanism and matching mechanism.Based on the status quo of market design in the digital economy,it discusses the roles played by the two design methods and the improvements that need to be made.It shows that the design of auction and matching mechanisms plays important roles in the digital economy,which are:(1)overcoming the inconvenience of off-site transactions(especially off-site bargaining transactions)to adapt to the constraints of digital platform transactions;(2)improving transaction quality and transparency to guarantee fair transaction;(3)quickly generating a more reasonable transaction price so that the transaction can be completed instantly;(4)reducing the cost of information collection and information processing to improve market activity.At the same time,where the market cannot play a role,it is necessary to use the government’s“visible hand”to protect the digital economy through administrative and legal means.In addition,we need to design a more effective auction mechanism based on the characteristics of the digital economy to prevent cheating in sealed auctions,and speed up the research progress of dynamic matching.
作者
俞宁
武华君
杨晓光
孙宁
YU Ning;WU Hua-jun;YANG Xiao-guang;SUN Ning(Institute for Social and Economic Research,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing Jiangsu 211815,China;School of Economics,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China;Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China)
出处
《北京交通大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第4期23-33,共11页
Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“就业匹配模型中的政策干预效应”(72073072)
国家自然科学基金重点项目“市场设计的理论研究”(72033004)
2020中国信息经济学乌家培资助计划项目(E20103521)
深圳市大数据研究院开放合作研究课题“身心健康影响因素与干预策略的大数据研究”(2019ORF01015)。
关键词
数字经济
市场设计
拍卖机制
匹配机制
digital economy
market design
auction mechanism
matching mechanism
