摘要
为更好地探究制造商与零售商之间关于产品定制权限的分配问题,提出一种制造商主导下的供应链企业产品定制权限分配的博弈模型。该模型基于Kano需求分析理论将产品定制模块按照消费者需求类型分为3类,并通过组合这3类定制模块得到4种产品定制方案。通过采用制造商主导下的Stackelberg博弈模型构建制造商和零售商之间的产品定制权限分配模型,对定制权限同质化和差异化两种情况下制造商和零售商的决策进行分析,并运用算例对该模型进行应用和求解,得出制造商主导下的制造商和零售商关于定制权限分配问题的最优解。结果表明,只有当制造商和零售商的产品定制范围呈现完全差异化特征时,制造商和零售商才取得关于产品定制权限的均衡解,实现供应链利润的最大化。
In order to better explore the distribution of product customization rights between manufacturers and retailers,a game model for the distribution of product customization rights of supply chain enterprises under the leadership of manufacturers is proposed.By the model,based on the theory of Kano demand analysis,product customization module types are divided into three categories according to the consumer demand,and through the combination of the three types of customized modules present four product customization schemes,dominated by the manufacturers through the use of Stackelberg game model.A model of product customization between manufacturers and retailers permissions distribution is built,analyzing the two cases of custom permissions homogeneity and differentiation of manufacturers and retailers decision.Using example application and solving the model,the optimal solution is derived from the custom permissions distribution of the manufacturer-led manufacturers and retailers.The results show that only when the product customization range of the manufacturer and the retailer is completely differentiated can the manufacturer and the retailer achieve the equilibrium solution of the product customization authority and maximize the profit of the supply chain.
作者
伊辉勇
张露
YI Huiyong;ZHANG Lu(School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China)
出处
《工业工程》
北大核心
2021年第6期75-82,92,共9页
Industrial Engineering Journal
基金
重庆市自然科学基金资助项目(cstc2020jcyj-msxmX0501)。
关键词
博弈
产品定制权限
供应链
制造商主导
game
product customization authority
supply chain
manufacturer's leadership
