摘要
文章选取2006—2019年沪深A股上市公司作为样本,基于声誉理论视角,研究CFO兼任董秘与应计盈余管理、真实盈余管理之间的关系。研究结果显示,CFO兼任董秘受声誉的激励约束会抑制公司的应计盈余管理,而真实盈余管理不受CFO兼任董秘的影响。进一步研究发现,CFO兼任董秘和董事强化了对应计盈余管理的抑制作用;与国有企业相比,CFO兼任董秘在非国有企业中与应计盈余管理的负相关关系更显著;董事会规模越大,CFO兼任董秘对应计盈余管理的抑制作用越弱。可见,我国资本市场应鼓励CFO兼任董秘的治理架构,并提高CFO及董秘在董事会中的地位。
Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2006 to 2019 as samples,this paper studies the relationship between CFO serving as a board secretary and accrual as well as real earnings management from the perspective of reputation theory. The results show that the incentive and constraint of reputation makes the CFO serving as a board secretary inhibit the accrual earnings management of the company,while the real earnings management is not affected. Further research shows that CFO serving as a board secretary and director strengthens the inhibiting effect of accrual earnings management;compared with state-owned enterprises,the negative correlation between CFO serving as a secretary and accrual earnings management is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises;the larger size of the board of directors is,the weaker inhibiting effect of CFO serving as a board secretary will be. Therefore,China’s capital market should encourage the governance structure of CFO serving as a board secretary and improve the status of CFO and board secretary.
作者
肖万
林冰儿
郭思圻
XIAO Wan;LIN Binger;GUO Siqi(School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510641,China;GF Securities Co.,Ltd.,Guangzhou 510627,China)
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第1期119-128,共10页
East China Economic Management
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“我国PPP模式社会资本收益问题研究”(16BJY174)。
关键词
CFO
董秘
应计盈余管理
真实盈余管理
声誉理论
CFO
board secretary
accrual earnings management
real earnings management
reputation theory
