摘要
基于政治经济周期理论,本文通过构建吸引国际直接投资的政治经济周期模型发现:东道国现任领导人会在临近大选换届时努力推动吸引国际直接投资流入,以促进劳动就业增加和经济增长,并最终达到胜选连任的目标,由此在临近大选换届时东道国的国际直接投资流入会显著增加。基于上述理论模型,本文实证检验发现:相较于非大选年,东道国在大选年的国际直接投资流入显著增加,其中以绿地投资形式进入的国际直接投资增长尤其显著。对东道国的政治体制进行分类后发现:相较于总统制东道国,议会制东道国的大选对国际直接投资流入的影响更为显著。本研究不仅提供了基于政治经济周期理论来研究国际资本流动的新视角,还为跨国企业特别是中国企业选择对外直接投资的最佳时机和最佳区位提供了基于政治经济周期理论的决策依据。
Based on political business cycle( PBC) theory,this paper constructed a PBC model with inward foreign direct investment( IFDI). It finds that,the incumbent of the host country will endeavor to push forward with attraction of IFDI near the general election,so as to promote domestic employment and economic growth for re-election target.Hence,the inflow of IFDI will significantly increase when the general election of host country approaches. According to the theoretical model mentioned above,this paper empirically reveals that, compared to non-election years, the IFDI of host country significantly increases in the general election year,especially for greenfield investment.Moreover,after the classification of political institutions,we find that,the general election of the parliamentary countries has more impacts on the inflow of IFDI than that in presidential countries. This paper not only offers new perspective on foreign capital inflow,but also propound on the optimal timing and location of China’s OFDI based on the PBC theory.
作者
毛杰
夏小宝
田素华
MAO Jie;XIA Xiaobao;TIAN Suhua
出处
《国际贸易问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第12期134-150,共17页
Journal of International Trade
基金
国家社科基金重大项目“中国IFDI与OFDI互动发展的内在机制与经济学解释”(16ZDA043)
中国博士后科学基金“输入性外生冲击、金融摩擦与重大经济风险”(2019M661386)
上海市“超级博士后”激励计划(2019159)
上海高水平地方高校创新团队项目。
关键词
政治经济周期
大选
国际直接投资
新政治经济学
政治体制
Political Business Cycle
General Election
Inward Foreign Direct Investment
New Political Economics
Political Institution
