摘要
在构建环境多元共治体系背景下,系统研究公众环境关注度对企业和地方政府环境治理的影响具有重要意义,为引导公众积极参与环境治理提供理论支持和政策建议。该研究构建中央政府-地方政府-企业-公众之间的博弈模型,分析公众环境关注度对企业环保行为和地方政府环境治理行为的影响,并利用2011—2019年的百度雾霾搜索指数分析公众环境关注度对企业环保技术投入和政府环境规制强度的影响。研究结果表明,公众环境关注度通过两种渠道对环境治理产生积极影响:一方面,公众环境关注度通过降低中央政府与地方政府和企业之间的信息不对称程度、抑制地方政府与企业的合谋行为,促进地方政府提高环境规制强度和环保基础设施建设投资,最终激励企业进行环保治理投资;另一方面,公众环境关注度提升市场对绿色产品和环保治理企业投资需求,促进环保治理企业规模扩张,最终带来环境质量提升。理论实证结果都表明公众环境关注度有效发挥了非正式环境规制的约束作用,激励污染企业环保转型的同时有效督促地方政府严格执行环境规制。中央政府应重视公众的环境不满意度;建立和推行环境标志制度,满足公众绿色商品需求;优化公众环境参与途径,将公众环境关注度转变为公众环境参与。还应根据各地区的人均收入水平对公众环境参与的异质性反应来制定差异化引导和激励机制,形成更为有效的政府、企业、公众良性互动的环境治理结构,改善环境治理效果。
Under the background of constructing a multi-party environment governance system,it is of great importance to systematically study the impact of public environmental attention on the environmental governance of enterprises and local governments.It could provide theoretical support and policy suggestions for guiding public participation in environmental governance.This paper constructed a game model among the central government,local governments,enterprises and the public to analyze the impact of public environmental attention on the game equilibrium of enterprises and local governments and empirically studied the impact of public environmental attention on enterprises’ environmental investment and environmental regulation intensity using Baidu Haze Search Index from 2011 to 2019.We found that public environmental attention positively influenced environmental governance through two channels:firstly,public participation promoted local governments to improve environmental regulation intensity and environmental infrastructure construction and encouraged enterprises to invest in environmental governance by alleviating information asymmetry among game players;secondly,public participation increased the demand for green products and investments for environmental protection enterprises,which would bring about the improvement of environmental quality.The results showed that public environmental attention played an important role in environmental governance as an informal environmental regulation.The central government should pay attention to public environmental dissatisfaction,promote green labelling system to meet public demand for green products,and optimize the channels of public environmental participation.Besides,the government should implement differentiated guiding policies and incentive mechanisms based on the heterogeneous response of environmental governance to public environmental attention in regions with differentiated income levels,thus forming a more effective environment governance system with benign interaction between all the players.
作者
吴力波
杨眉敏
孙可哿
WU Libo;YANG Meimin;SUN Kege(School of Economics,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China;Center for Energy Economics and Strategy Studies,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China;Institute of Ecology and Sustainable Development,Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences,Shanghai 200020)
出处
《中国人口·资源与环境》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第2期1-14,共14页
China Population,Resources and Environment
基金
国家杰出青年科学基金项目“能源环境经济与政策分析”(批准号:71925010)
国家重点研发计划“全球变化及应对”重点专项课题“推动产业与区域协同有序适应气候变化的理论和综合模式”(批准号:2020YFA0608602)
上海市经济和信息化委员会人工智能创新发展专项基金(批准号:沪经信技(2018)947号)。
关键词
环境治理
公众环境关注度
百度搜索指数
股指超额收益率
博弈模型
environmental governance
public environmental attention
Baidu Search Index
stock abnormal return
game theory
