摘要
基于管理者过度自信理论,选取2010—2018年A股上市企业的经验数据,对管理者过度自信、控股股东股权质押与投资效率三者之间的传导机制进行探讨。研究结果表明,控股股东股权质押行为在管理者过度自信与投资效率之间起到部分中介作用;在过度投资样本中,控股股东股权质押行为在管理者过度自信与过度投资之间起到部分中介作用;在投资不足样本中,控股股东股权质押行为在管理者过度自信与投资不足之间的中介效应也十分显著;过度投资样本中控股股东股权质押行为的中介作用比投资不足样本更为显著。
Based on the theory of manager’s overconfidence,this paper selects the empirical data of A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2018 to explore the transmission mechanism between manager’s overconfidence,controlling shareholder equity pledge and investment efficiency.The research results show that,The pledge of controlling shareholder’s equity plays a part of the intermediary role between managers’overconfidence and investment efficiency;in the over-investment sample,the pledge of controlling shareholder’s equity plays a part of the intermediary role between manager’s overconfidence and overinvestment;in investment In the insufficient samples,the mediating effect of the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge behavior between managers’overconfidence and underinvestment is also significant;the mediating effect of the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge behavior in the overinvestment sample is more significant than that of the underinvestment sample.
作者
范宝学
刘昭
FAN Bao-xue;LIU Zhao(Liaoning Technical University,Huludao 125100,China)
出处
《哈尔滨商业大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2022年第2期85-96,共12页
Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition
关键词
管理者过度自信
控股股东股权质押
投资效率
过度投资
投资不足
manager overconfidence
controlling shareholder equity pledge
investment efficiency
overinvestment
underinvestment
