摘要
近年来,企业内部高管与普通员工的薪酬差距持续扩大已成为中国收入分配差距不断拉大的缩影,备受各界关注。本文基于2009—2020年中国A股上市公司数据,利用金税三期工程这一税收征管数字化实践的准自然实验,检验了税收征管作为外部监督机制对企业内部薪酬差距的治理作用。研究发现,金税三期工程这一税收征管数字化举措对企业内部薪酬差距具有显著的抑制效应,并且这种抑制效应主要表现为税收征管数字化减小了超额薪酬差距,进而缩小了企业内部薪酬差距。进一步研究发现,税收征管数字化发挥治理效应的影响路径并不在于提高普通员工的工资,而在于抑制高管薪酬尤其是高管超额薪酬;税收征管数字化降低企业内部薪酬差距的作用机制是通过改善企业信息环境和缓解代理问题,促使企业内部薪酬差距更趋合理;税收征管数字化对企业内部薪酬差距的治理效应在内部控制质量较低、外部审计监督不力和高管薪酬操纵动机强烈的企业中表现更明显。此外,税收征管数字化还增强了企业合理薪酬差距的激励效应,最终提升了企业业绩。本文的研究在理论上为探索企业内部薪酬差距的治理机制提供了新视角,在实践上为进一步完善税收征管体制与深化收入分配制度改革提供了决策参考。
In recent years,the pay gap between corporate executives and ordinary employees has become a microcosm of the growing income gap in China,and has attracted attention from all walks of life.Using the data of China’s listed companies from 2009 to 2020,this paper takes the“Golden Tax-Ⅲproject”as a quasi-natural experiment in the digital practice of tax enforcement,to empirically test the role of tax enforcement,an external supervision mechanism,on the governance of the firm pay gap.The results show that the digital tax enforcement based on the“Golden Tax-Ⅲproject”has a significant negative effect on the firm pay gap,which is manifested in the fact that the digital tax enforcement has narrowed the firm pay gap by restraining the excessive firm pay gap.Further research finds that the effective path of digital tax enforcement is not to increase the salary of ordinary employees,but to reduce the compensation of the executives by suppressing the excessive compensation of the executives.The mechanism of the digital tax enforcement in restraining the firm pay gap is to improve the corporate information environment and alleviate agency problems,making the firm pay gap more reasonable.This effect mainly exists in companies with lower internal control quality,weaker external auditing and stronger executive compensation manipulation motivation.In addition,the digital tax enforcement can also further strengthen the incentive effect of a reasonable firm pay gap on corporate performance.The paper provides a new perspective for exploring the governance mechanism of the firm pay gap in theory,and provides a decision-making reference for improving the construction of tax enforcement and deepening the reform of income distribution system in practice.
作者
魏志华
王孝华
蔡伟毅
WEI Zhi-hua;WANG Xiao-hua;CAI Wei-yi(School of Economics,Xiamen University,Xiamen 361005,China)
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第3期152-170,共19页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“中国上市公司避税天堂投资:动机、经济后果与治理机制”(批准号71972163)
国家自然科学基金重大项目“中国制度和文化背景下公司财务政策的理论与实践研究”(批准号71790601)
国家社会科学基金后期资助项目“中国OFDI逆向技术溢出与技术进步及其异质性研究”(批准号21FJLB022)。
关键词
税收征管数字化
薪酬差距
公司治理
超额薪酬
digital tax enforcement
firm pay gap
corporate governance
excessive compensation
