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双积分政策下考虑双车型联合生产的研发投资策略 被引量:5

Research on Technology Investment Strategy of Automobile Manufacturers'Dual Vehicle Production Mode Under Double-Score System
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摘要 实施双积分政策是引导传统车企加大节能减排研发投入的重要途径。本文基于双积分政策构建垄断汽车制造商和竞争经销商组成的二级供应链,研究汽车制造商同时生产燃油车和新能源车的研发投资策略,探讨双积分政策和研发投资策略的交互影响。研究表明,在双车型生产模式下,双积分政策对燃油车燃油能耗的核算直接影响制造商研发投资策略,只有实际能耗和标准能耗适中时,汽车制造商才会同时对两类车型进行研发投资;提高研发投资水平总能增加新能源积分,但只有在其得分效率较高时才能增加燃油消耗积分;双积分政策对燃油车节能减排标准越严格,燃油车产销量越少,但并不一定能激励节能降耗的研发投资,车型能耗水平并不一定改善。 Implementing the double-score policy is an important way to guide traditional car enterprises to increase investment in energy conservation and emission reduction research and development.Based on the double-score system,this paper constructs a secondary supply chain consisting of a monopoly automaker and two competitive dealers,and studies the technology investment strategy of manufacturer simultaneously producing traditional energy vehicles and new energy vehicles,exploring the interaction between the double-score system and the technology investment strategy.Research shows that in the dual-vehicle production mode,the initial energy consumption of traditional energy vehicles directly affects the technology investment strategy of the manufacturer.Only when the actual energy consumption and standard energy consumption are moderate,the manufacturer will invest in technology for both types of vehicles at the same time.Secondly,the technology investment of new energy vehicles can always increase the new energy scores.The technology investment of traditional energy vehicles can increase the fuel consumption scores only when the technology investment scoring efficiency is high.Finally,the more stringent the double-score system is,the stricter the energy-saving and emission-reduction standards of traditional energy vehicles,the less the production and sales of traditional energy vehicles,but it does not necessarily encourage technology investment of energy-saving and emission reduction,and the energy consumption level of traditional energy vehicles does not necessarily improve.
作者 王阳 Wang Yang(School of Management,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,China)
出处 《工业技术经济》 北大核心 2022年第7期76-87,共12页 Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
基金 广州城市职业学院科研团队项目“供应链优化与管理研究”(项目编号:2020KYTD006) 广东省普通高校创新团队项目“战略新兴产业协同创新研究团队”(项目编号:2020WCXTD032)
关键词 双积分政策 传统车企 双车型生产 研发投资策略 汽车油耗 节能减排 double-score system traditional car enterprise dual vehicle production technology investment strategy vehicle fuel consumption energy conservation and emissions reduction
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