摘要
采用2013—2019年中国258个地级市的面板数据,使用双向固定效应模型实证检验了地方官员变更与农民收入之间的关系。研究发现:地方官员变更会显著抑制农民收入增长;机制检验结果显示,政策不确定性越强、政府干预程度越高,官员变更对农民收入增长的抑制效应越明显;具体路径探寻发现,新任官员可以通过提高农民融资约束、降低农民生产经营性收入和务工收入、减少农林水事务支出三条渠道对农民收入产生负向影响;异质性分析发现,官员的年龄和籍贯特征对农民收入具有显著影响。
Using the panel data of 258 prefecture-level cities in China from 2013 to 2019,the paper applied the two-way fixed effect model to empirically examine the relationship between local officials'change and farmers'income.The study found that the change of local officials would significantly inhibit the growth of farmers'income.The mechanism test showed that stronger policy uncertainty and more government intervention may enhance the inhibiting effect of officials'change.Path exploration revealed that,new officials may exert a negative impact through three paths,that is,improving farmers'financing constraints,as well as reducing the expenditures on agriculture,forestry and water affairs.Heterogeneity analysis showed that the age and native place of officials had a significant impact on farmers'income.
作者
肖亚成
曹壹帆
邹宝玲
XIAO Ya-cheng;CAO Yi-fan;ZOU Bao-ling(College of Economics and Management,Southwest University,Chongqing 400715;Institute for Rural Revitalization Strategy,Southwest University,Chongqing 400715;Center for Rural Economics and Management research,Southwest University,Chongqing 400715,China)
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第4期14-29,共16页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社科基金青年项目(17CJY031)
国家社科基金重点项目(21AZD032,20AZD080)。
关键词
官员变更
政策不确定性
农民收入
双向固定效应模型
行政干预
change of officials
policy uncertainty
farmers'income
two-way fixed effect model
administrative interference
