摘要
本文研究了零售商让渡零售渠道延保服务销售权下制造商渠道入侵问题。研究分别构建了不订立和订立延保服务授权条件契约两种情形下供应链博弈模型,刻画了不同入侵成本下制造商的最优入侵、定价以及销售策略。研究表明满足固定入侵成本条件时,渠道入侵有利于改善制造商利润。若双方不签订契约,零售商利润必会随制造商渠道入侵而减少。制造商渠道入侵主要取决于固定入侵成本,其次取决于零售商提供的延保服务授权条件契约,该契约在一定程度上阻止直销渠道的建立,但零售商并非一味利用契约阻止渠道入侵。零售商不提供延保服务情形下,零售商即使推断制造商不入侵也会在市场潜在规模较大时提供延保服务授权条件契约,而制造商始终愿意签订契约;提供延保服务情形下,若明确制造商不入侵,零售商始终不提供延保服务授权条件契约,制造商签订契约的条件也更加苛刻。本文最后通过数值分析验证了理论的正确性和有效性。
Increasing competition in the product market is forcing manufacturers and retailers to seek new profit opportunities,including launching direct channel,or providing extended warranty on high-value durable goods.Therefore,reasonable extended warranty and manufacturer encroachment strategies can increase the revenues of supply chain members,and strengthen the cooperation between members.Because of the benefit,we decided to explore manufacturer encroachment strategies under the condition that the retailer gave up extended warranty sales right in the retail channel.Specifically,we study the supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer.The manufacturer intends to launch direct channel in an attempt to diversify sales,while the retailer tries to sign a contract with the manufacturer on the terms of the extended warranty authorization.By authorizing the manufacturer to sell extended warranty in the retail channel in exchange for the manufacturer giving up on establishing direct channel.The research questions are as follows:(1)What is the manufacturer′s optimal encroachment strategy with or without the contract?(2)If don′t sign the contract,will manufacturer encroachment necessarily damage the retailer′s profits?(3)Does the contract have any effect on manufacturer encroachment?(4)What are the conditions for the retailer and the manufacturer to sign the contract?In the rest of the following paper,first,game theory is used to develop the dual-channel and single-channel supply chain decisionmaking models under two cases,i.e.,sign the contract or not.Second,the standard backward induction is used to derive the equilibrium solution in each channel and the optimal profits of both manufacture and retailer.Third,by comparing the profit of the manufacturer when not launching and launching the direct channel without sign the contract,the conditions for manufacture to launch the direct channel are obtained.At last,the impact of the contract on manufacturer′s direct channel launching decision was discussed by comparing the differences between the conditions for manufacturer to launch direct channel under two cases.Through the analysis above,our research reveals that manufacturer encroachment helps to improve its revenue when the fixed entry cost is met.If don′t sign the contract,the retailer′s profit will inevitably decrease with manufacturer encroachment.Manufacturer encroachment depends mainly on the fixed entry cost,and secondly on the contract,that is,the contract prevents launching the direct channel to a certain degree.However,the retailer is not always using the contract to prevent manufacturer encroachment.In the case of the retailer does not offer extended warranty,retailer will offer the contract when the market potential is large even if the manufacturer will not encroach,and the manufacturer is willing to sign the contract.In another case,the retailer will never offer the contract if the manufacturer will not encroach,and the condition for the manufacturer to sign the contract are more stringent.Certainly,our work is limited and can be extended from many aspects.For example,when there is a difference in the quality of the extended warranty between the retailer and the manufacturer,what impact will the manufacturer′s encroachment have?As in the current study,more and more attention has been paid to the dominant retailer,while many papers also assume that the dominant retailer may control the extended warranty sales.Thus,how would the manufacturer′s encroachment decision and the retailer′s extended warranty sales decision interact with each other?Further investigation in this direction may lead to fruitful results.
作者
刘震
经有国
秦开大
LIU Zhen;JING Youguo;QIN Kaida(Faculty of Management and Economics,Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming 650093,China)
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第4期186-195,共10页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(21YJC630049)
云南省基础研究计划资助项目(2019FB087)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71461014)。
关键词
延长保修
制造商入侵
延保服务授权条件契约
Extended warranty
Manufacturer encroachment
Extended warranty authorization condition contract
