摘要
借助演化博弈理论构建基层政府、企业及寨民三方主体的合作博弈模型,分析在民族村寨旅游开发过程中影响三方合作的因素,并通过牟托羌寨、桃坪羌寨、甲居藏寨三个典型案例对分析结果进行检验。研究发现:提高基层政府不监管的成本、增加对企业的违约惩罚及提高寨民的净收益是促进三方合作的重要因素;基层政府的监管缺位必定引发企业的违约;企业遵守合约的积极性与惩罚力度成正相关;寨民参与的积极性受到净收益和企业对其利益侵占的影响,与政府补贴无关。为此要提高村寨基层政府的行政能力、创新对入驻企业的制约机制以及增加寨民利益的获得方式。
Based on the evolutionary game theory,this paper constructs a cooperative game model of the government,enterprises and villagers in ethnic villages to analyze the factors affecting the tripartite cooperation in the process of ethnic tourism development,and tests the analysis results through the typical cases of Moutuo Qiangzhai,Taoping Qiangzhai and Jiaju Zangzhai.It is found that raising the cost of grass-roots government’s non-supervision,increasing the default cost of enterprises settled in and increasing the net profit of villagers are the important factors to promote tripartite cooperation.The absence of grassroots government supervision will definitely lead to the default of enterprises;the enthusiasm of enterprises to comply with the contract is positively correlated with the intensity of punishment;the enthusiasm of the villagers to participate in is affected by the net income and the encroachment of the enterprise on their interests,and has nothing to do with government subsidies.Therefore,it is proposed to improve the grass-roots government’s governance ability,innovate the restriction mechanism for enterprises and increase the ways to obtain the benefits of villagers.
作者
刘冰冰
王志标
LIU Bing-Bing;WANG Zhi-Biao(School of Economics and Management,Communication University of China,Beijing 100024,China;Journal Editorial Department,Yangtze Normal University,Chongqing 408100,China)
出处
《长江师范学院学报》
2022年第4期56-64,共9页
Journal of Yangtze Normal University
基金
重庆市自然科学基金面上项目“重庆传统节庆经济价值与文化价值评估”(cstc2019jcyj-msxmX0682)
国家社会科学基金一般项目“武陵山片区少数民族特色村寨旅游稳定脱贫的实证研究”(20BMZ145)。
关键词
旅游开发
民族村寨
多元主体
演化博弈
tourism development
ethnic villages
multiple subjects
evolutionary game
