摘要
为解决政府付费PPP项目因公私双方信息不对称引发的偷懒问题和政府激励不足引发的整体次优问题,本文基于演化博弈理论,研究了不同奖惩制度对政府和私营部门的稳定策略的影响,并确定了最优奖惩系数的阈值。结果表明:在私营部门具有信息优势和政府激励不足的情形下,缺乏奖惩制度的支付机制会导致偷懒问题和整体次优问题,而引入奖惩制度、确定合适奖惩系数的支付机制可有效解决偷懒问题和整体次优问题。
To solve the laziness problem caused by the information asymmetry between the public and private sector and the overall suboptimal problem caused by the insufficient government incentive in the existing government-paid PPP projects.On account of EGT,the influence of different reward and punishment mechanisms on government and private sector system stability strategies is studied in this paper,with the optimal threshold of reward and punishment coefficients determined.The results show that:when the private sector has the information advantage and the government has an insufficient incentive,the payment mechanism without reward and punishment system can lead to the laziness problem and the overall suboptimal problem,while introducing the reward and punishment mechanism and determining the appropriate reward and punishment coefficients of payment mechanism can effectively solve the laziness problem and the overall suboptimal problem.
作者
吕俊娜
陈博雅
Lü Junna;CHEN Boya(School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China)
出处
《西安理工大学学报》
CAS
北大核心
2022年第2期223-230,235,共9页
Journal of Xi'an University of Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71701028)
国家社会科学基金资助项目(16CJL054)
教育部人文社科基金资助项目(15YJCZH105)。
关键词
政府付费PPP项目
奖惩系数
支付机制
激励相容
government-paid PPP projects
reward and punishment coefficients
payment mechanism
incentive compatibility
