摘要
受启发于近些年频繁曝出的消费者权益保护问题,为探析消费者行为对电商生态系统中其他群体策略选择的影响,本文基于演化博弈理论,考虑消费者的投诉行为,构建由政府、电商平台、商家以及消费者组成的四方演化博弈模型;讨论各方主体的策略选择,分析策略组合稳定点,并应用MATLAB工具进行仿真模拟实验。经上述研究,本文得出结论:消费者的投诉行为有利于促进政府严格监管、电商平台严格管理、商家诚信经营。由此,建议政府和电商平台充分发挥监督管理作用,以更好地保障消费者的合法权益,并遏制消费者的恶意投诉行为,从而实现电商生态系统的稳定可持续发展。
Inspired by the frequent exposure of consumer rights protection issues in recent years,this paper aims to explore the impact of consumer behaviors on the strategic choices of other groups in the e-commerce ecosystem.For this purpose,we construct a four-party evolutionary game model,involving the government,e-commerce platforms,businesses and consumers.The evolutionary stable strategies under different conditions of the four-party evolutionary game are explored and the effect from different factors on the decision-makings of participants for the e-commerce ecosystem are also analyzed.Numerical analysis results show that consumers’complaint behaviors are conducive to promoting strict government supervision,strict management of e-commerce platforms and honest operation of merchants.Our work enriches an understanding of the governance for the the e-commerce ecosystem,and provides theoretical support for the related participants to make proper decisions in the e-commerce ecosystem.
作者
王辛辛
程郁琨
田晓明
许智琪
陈瑾冕
WANG Xinxin;CHENG Yukun;TIAN Xiaoming;XU Zhiqi;CHEN Jinmian(School of Business,Suzhou University of Science and Technology,Suzhou 215009,Jiangsu,China;School of Education,Suzhou University of Science and Technology,Suzhou 215009,Jiangsu,China;Think Tank for Urban Development,Suzhou Uni-versity of Science and Technology,Suzhou 215009,Jiangsu,China)
出处
《运筹学学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第1期23-42,共20页
Operations Research Transactions
基金
国家自然科学基金(Nos.11871366,71974140)
江苏高校“青蓝工程”中青年学术带头人
江苏高校“青蓝工程”青年骨干教师
江苏省研究生科研创新计划(No.KYCX21-3000)。
关键词
电商生态系统
四方演化博弈
演化稳定策略
消费者投诉
e-commerce ecosystem
four-party evolutionary game
evolutionary stabilization strategy
consumer behavior
