摘要
重大工程创新团队面临的外部环境是深度不确定的。基于网络博弈理论和多主体建模工具Netlogo,探讨了深度不确定性下重大工程创新团队的创新行为的演化规律。研究发现:(1)深度不确定性能激励创新主体投入更高的创新努力,但也会抑制创新主体的协作努力,创新主体需要更多的协同创新者分担风险;(2)固定收益能激励面临深度不确定性的创新主体付出更高的创新努力,但这种激励的效用是边际递减的;(3)当调节系数处于合理区间时,动态收益共享机制对面临深度不确定性的创新主体具有激励作用,但当调节系数超出该区间时,创新合作可能会被瓦解。
The innovation teams of megaprojects face deep uncertain external environment.The evolutionary laws of innovation behavior are studied based on network game and Netlogo.The results show that:(1)Deep uncertainty can stimulate innovation subjects to pay more innovation effort,but it can also inhibit the collaborative effort of innovation subjects.Innovation subjects need more collaborative innovators to share the risks.(2)Fixed income can motivate the innovation subjects to pay higher innovation effort.However,the utility of such incentive is gradually diminishing.(3)When adjustment coefficient is in a reasonable scope,a dynamic benefits sharing mechanism has an incentive effect on innovation subjects facing deep uncertainty,but the cooperation in innovation teams may be disintegrated whenthe adjustment coefficient is beyond the reasonable scope.
作者
何海艳
周国华
郑立宁
HE Hai-yan;ZHOU Guo-hua;ZHENG Li-ning(School of Architecture and Civil Engineering,Chengdu University,Chengdu 610106,China;School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China;China Southwest Geotechnical Investigation&Design Institute Co.,Ltd,Chengdu 610073,China)
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第10期139-146,共8页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金重大专项(71942006)
国家社会科学基金资助项目(15AZD057)。
关键词
深度不确定性
重大工程
协同创新
网络博弈
川藏铁路
deep uncertainty
megaprojects
collaborative innovation
network game
Sichuan-Tibet railway
