摘要
为了解决垄断供应商对下游制造商提供零部件升级的“卡脖子”问题,本文构建了由一个垄断供应商和两个竞争制造商组成的“卡脖子”模型,分析了垄断供应商是否应针对性地实施限制零部件升级的“卡脖子”策略。研究表明在分散决策下,垄断供应商针对性地实施“卡脖子”策略且提高批发价,才能收回研发成本,获得“卡脖子”的溢出收益,而被“卡脖子”的制造商不一定损失市场需求或退出市场;在集中决策下,集中供应链从竞争对手的“卡脖子”策略中获得溢出收益,而被“卡脖子”的制造商利润下降。研究结论为当前解决我国关键核心技术“卡脖子”问题提供理论支撑。
To solve the neck-jamming problem of components and parts'upgrade that is provided to competitive manufactures by a monopoly supplier,this paper constructs a neck-jamming model composed of a monopoly supplier and two competitive manufacturers.This paper analyzes whether the monopoly supplier should implement the neck-jamming strategy.The results show that the monopoly supplier can recover R&D costs and gain spillover benefits by implementing targeted neck-jamming strategies and raising wholesale prices under the decentralized decision-making,while the jammed manufacturers do not necessarily lose market demand or withdraw from the market.Under the centralized decision-making,the centralized supply chain gains spillover benefits from the neck-jamming strategy,while the profits of the jammed manufacturer decline.This paper provides theoretical support for solving the neck-jamming problem in China.
作者
刘占宇
王玉洁
王琢
LIU Zhan-yu;WANG Yu-jie;WANG Zhuo(Consultation Center of China Coal Industry Association,Beijing 100013,China;School of Economics and Management,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China)
出处
《价值工程》
2022年第31期62-64,共3页
Value Engineering
