摘要
在碳达峰碳中和约束下,碳税博弈中的政府和企业作为利益双方,其决策行为的选择主要受其决策成本和收益决定,且博弈双方决策行为互相影响。对于企业来说,企业信息系统的完善、政府监管成本的下降与低碳产品销售量的增加可以提高企业生产低碳产品的概率;而对于政府来说,当普通产品的净利润高于低碳产品时,政府实行碳税制度的可能较大。因此,推动建立企业碳排放信息披露制度、降低地方政府的监管成本、合理设定碳税、促进低碳产品增加销量等措施可以有效促进企业的低碳转型。这不仅有助于我国碳税政策的实施,也对企业的精准碳减排和绿色低碳转型升级发挥着重要作用,对我国双碳目标的实现具有重要意义。
Under the constraints of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality,the government and enterprises in the carbon tax game are both interested parties. The choice of their decision-making behavior is mainly determined by their decision-making costs and benefits,and the both sides in the game affect each other. For enterprises,the improvement of enterprise information systems,the reduction of government supervision costs and the increase in sales of low-carbon products can increase the probability of enterprises producing low-carbon products;while for the government,when the net profit of ordinary products is higher than that of low-carbon products,it is more likely to implement a carbon tax system. Therefore,measures such as promoting the establishment of a corporate carbon emission information disclosure system,reducing the regulatory cost of local governments,rationally setting carbon taxes,and promoting the increase in sales of low-carbon products can effectively promote the low-carbon transformation of enterprises. This not only contributes to the implementation of China′s carbon tax policy,but also plays an important role in the precise carbon emission reduction and green and low-carbon transformation and upgrading of enterprises. It is of great significance to the realization of the nation′s dual carbon goals.
作者
李凤荣
何柏霖
LI Feng-rong;HE Bai-lin(Jilin Province Economic Management Cadre College,Changchun 130000,China;College of New Energy and Environment,Jilin University,Changchun 130012,China)
出处
《税务与经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第5期53-59,共7页
Taxation and Economy
关键词
碳税
博弈论
政府
企业
carbon tax
game theory
government
enterprises
