摘要
全过程工程咨询模式下,约束咨询方因信息不对称而出现的投机行为,激励其积极利用共享信息的价值促进项目效益最大化,对于工程项目的顺利开展至关重要。基于演化博弈理论,构建全过程工程咨询模式下业主与咨询方的激励机制-信息共享动态演化博弈模型,探索业主采取激励措施与咨询方积极共享信息之间的博弈行为。采用MATLAB模拟双方演化博弈路径,分析影响双方选择积极策略的关键因素。结果表明:选择积极策略的初始概率会影响双方的演化行为;影响双方选择积极策略的不利因素按作用程度递减依次为成本系数、风险系数、投机收益系数;影响双方选择积极策略的有利因素按作用程度递减依次为单方收益系数、协同收益系数、奖励惩罚系数、信息共享水平。
Under the whole-process engineering consulting mode,it is very important for the smooth development of the project to restrain the speculative behavior of the consulting party due to information asymmetry and encourage them to actively use the value of shared information to maximize the project benefits.Based on evolutionary game theory,the dynamic evolutionary game model of incentive mechanism-information sharing between owner and consultant was constructed under the whole-process engineering consulting mode.The game behavior between the owner taking incentive measures and consultants actively sharing information was explored.MATLAB was used to simulate the evolutionary game path of the two parties,and the key factors affecting the choice of active strategies by both parties were analyzed.The results show that the initial probability of choosing an active strategy affects the evolutionary behavior of both parties.The unfavorable factors influencing the choice of active strategies by both parties are in descending order,cost coefficient,risk coefficient and the speculative profit coefficient.The favorable factors influencing the choice of active strategies by both parties are,in descending order,unilateral benefit coefficient,synergistic benefit coefficient,reward and penalty coefficient,and the level of information sharing.
作者
孙钢柱
昝晓方
严亚丹
SUN Gangzhu;ZAN Xiaofang;YAN Yadan(School of Water Conservancy and Civil Engineering,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China)
出处
《土木工程与管理学报》
2022年第6期9-17,共9页
Journal of Civil Engineering and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金(51678535)
中国建筑劳动学会重点项目(CCLI2021R0028)。
关键词
全过程工程咨询
信息共享
激励机制
演化博弈
whole-process engineering consulting
information sharing
incentive mechanism
evolutionary game