摘要
渠道入侵正逐渐成为企业开拓市场,实现多渠道销售的重要策略。在考虑零售商销售努力的前提下,研究了制造商渠道入侵策略。构建了四种Stackelberg博弈模型:不入侵和无销售努力、入侵和无销售努力、不入侵和有销售努力、入侵和有销售努力。研究结果表明,线上直销渠道与线下零售渠道之间的不对称替代水平越高,越不利于制造商入侵;在制造商入侵的情况下,零售商销售努力促使制造商降低批发价格;渠道入侵成本较大且零售商销售努力投资效率高的前提下,销售努力可以有效缓解制造商入侵带来的负面影响;渠道入侵降低了零售商销售努力的动机。
Channel encroachment is gradually becoming an important strategy for enterprises to exploit the market and realize multi-channel sales.Considering the retailer’s sales effort, this paper studies the manufacturer’s channel encroachment decision. Four Stackelberg game models are constructed: no encroachmentand no sales effort, encroachment and no sales effort, no encroachment and invest in sales effort, encroachment and invest in sales effort. The research results show that when the manufacturer encroaches, the higher the level of asymmetric substitution between online direct channel and offline retail channel, the more unfavorable for the manufacturer to encroach. In the case of manufacturer encroachment, the retailer’s sales effort encourages the manufacturer to lower the wholesale price;when the cost of the manufacturer encroachment is large and the investment efficiency of retailer’s sales effort is high, the sales effort may be an effective anti-encroachment strategy for the retailer;the manufacturer encroachment reduces sales effort level of retailer.
作者
张冲
刘影
ZHANG Chong;LIU Ying(School of Management,Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Nanjing 210003,China)
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第12期86-92,共7页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家社会科学基金项目资助(18BGL021)
国家自然科学基金项目资助(71601099)
江苏省研究生科研创新计划(KYCX20_0830)
南京邮电大学校科研基金资助(NY220212)。
