摘要
基于高管团队内部偏好的异质性,从关键下属高管的利益远视者视角出发,考察关键下属高管自下而上的内部治理对CEO真实盈余管理的治理机制。实证研究发现:关键下属高管治理不仅对CEO盈余管理具有显著的抑制作用,还呈现出“为与不为”的儒家精神。当CEO进行向下盈余管理时,关键下属高管会选择性忽视;当高管团队外部治理机制失效时,关键下属高管将对CEO盈余管理进行补位性治理。此外,公司业务复杂度与资源分散度、研发投入与关联交易在关键下属高管对CEO盈余管理的治理中,分别起到调节机制作用与中介机制作用。
Based on the heterogeneity of preferences within the top management team,from a farsighted perspective of the interests of key subordinate executives,this study investigates the governance mechanism of key subordinate executives’bottom-up internal governance on CEO’s real earnings management.The empirical study finds that the governance of key subordinate executives not only has a significant inhibiting effect on CEO’s earnings management,but also shows the Confucian spirit of“Should Do and Should Not”.When the CEO conducts downward earnings management,the key subordinate executives will selectively ignore it.When the external governance mechanism of the top management team fails,the key subordinate executives will conduct supplementary governance on the CEO’s earnings management.In addition,corporate business complexity and resource dispersion,as well as R&D investment and related transactions play a moderating mechanism and mediating mechanism role in the governance of key subordinate executives on CEO earnings management,respectively.
作者
吴凡
况学文
李建红
罗晓萌
WU Fan;KUANG Xuewen;LI Jianhong;LUO Xiaomeng(Nanchang University,Nanchang,China;Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan,China;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu,China)
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第1期127-136,共10页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71962018)
国家自然科学基金资助青年科学基金项目(72101210)。
关键词
高管团队
内部治理
下属高管
盈余管理
top management team
internal governance
subordinate executives
earnings management
