摘要
高铁四电建设工程作为复杂的系统性工程,具有隐蔽工程多、接口问题解决难、各专业之间协调困难等特征,其质量安全一直以来都是人们十分关注的问题和重点研究对象。但是,信息共享作为影响质量安全的因素之一,却很少有对其单独进行研究的报道。为此,基于演化博弈理论,对高铁四电建设工程建设方、设计方和施工方三方之间信息共享演化博弈行为进行研究,构建三方博弈模型,探讨各参建方内在演化机理。在有限理性条件下,根据各自目标构建三方博弈收益矩阵,建立复制动态方程进行演化路径分析,运用雅可比矩阵对系统均衡点进行局部稳定性分析,然后利用数值仿真模拟对三方之间博弈行为进行分析,讨论不同因素的变化对演化路径影响。研究结果表明:在初始的情况下,由于数值较小,入不敷出,三方都选择消极进行信息共享;随着促进信息共享额外收益和信息协同收益的增加,促进信息共享成本、信息不对称收益和积极信息共享成本的降低,以及奖罚力度和信息贡献率的合理化,系统会朝着三方都选择积极信息共享的方向发展,最终达到稳定状态。仿真分析的结果与系统稳定性分析的结果一致且有效,说明所建模型有效,可为各参建方信息共享提供参考。
As a complex systematic project, high-speed railway four electricity construction project has the characteristics of many concealed projects, difficult to solve interface problems and difficult coordination among disciplines. Its quality and safety have always been the problem of great concern and key research object.However, as one of the factors affecting quality and safety, information sharing is rarely studied separately.Therefore, based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper studied the evolutionary game behavior of information sharing among the three parties of High-speed Railway four power construction project. The tripartite game model was constructed, and the internal evolution mechanism of each participant was discussed. Under the condition of bounded rationality, this paper constructed the tripartite game income matrix according to their respective objectives, and established the replication dynamic equation for evolution path analysis. The Jacobian matrix to analyze the local stability of the system equilibrium point was adopted. The numerical simulation was used to analyze the game behavior among the three parties, and the influence of the changes of different factors on the evolution path was discussed. The results show that in the initial case, due to the small value, the three parties choose to share information passively. With the increase of additional benefits of information sharing and information synergy, the reduction of information sharing cost, information asymmetry benefit and positive information sharing cost, as well as the rationalization of reward and punishment and information contribution rate. The system will develop in the direction of active information sharing selected by all three parties, and finally reach a stable state. The results of the simulation analysis are consistent and effective with the results of the system stability analysis, which shows that the model is effective and can provide a reference for the information sharing of all participants.
作者
陈雍君
王璐琳
王卫东
王劲
汪思成
邱实
CHEN Yongjun;WANG Lulin;WANG Weidong;WANG Jin;WANG Sicheng;QIU Shi(School of Urban Economics and Management,Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture,Beijing 102616,China;School of Civil Engineering,Central South University,Changsha 410075,China;National Engineering Research Center for High-speed Railway Construction Technology,Changsha 410075,China;Center for Railway Infrastructure Smart Monitoring and Management,Central South University,Changsha 410075,China)
出处
《铁道科学与工程学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第1期44-52,共9页
Journal of Railway Science and Engineering
基金
中国工程院战略研究与咨询项目(2021-XBZD-2)。
关键词
高铁四电
信息共享
演化博弈
仿真模拟
high-speed railroad electrification
information sharing
evolution game
simulation
